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Abstract
This dissertation research focuses on two key aspects of cloud computing research – pricing and security
using data-driven techniques such as deep learning and econometrics. The first dissertation essay (Chapter
1) examines the adoption of spot market in cloud computing and builds IT investment estimation models
for organizations adopting cloud spot market. The second dissertation essay (Chapter 2 and 3) studies
proactive threat detection and prediction in cloud computing. The final dissertation essay (Chapter 4)
develops a secured cloud file system which protects organizations using cloud computing in case of
accidental data leaks.
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Chapter 1: Spot market adoption in cloud computing
1.1 Abstract
Organizations can significantly reduce the costs of computing resources by adopting auction-based pricing
mechanisms using spot instances in the cloud. However, dynamic prices of spot instances posit managerial
challenges in forecasting IT investment. Using a design science paradigm, we develop IT artifacts –
forecasting models and an algorithm for estimating IT investment. Our Substitution Effect Model (SEM)
leverages the price inter-relationship among the spot instances over operating system, hardware type, and
location of the data center. Moreover, drawing from online auction price forecasting literature, our
Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM) incorporates price dynamics along with substitution
effect. We find that the SEM significantly reduces mean absolute percent error and root mean square error
for one-month ahead IT investment prediction compared to traditional autoregressive model, though SEDM
does not improve IT investment forecasts over SEM. Our results are robust with respect to price volatility
of spot instances. Our contribution to research in cloud computing is two-fold. First, we show that customers
substitute spot instances across the operating system, hardware type and location of the data center to
leverage the price difference among the spot instances. This finding is new in literature. Second, we propose
and verify a robust forecasting model for IT investment under spot market usage.
Keywords: Cloud computing, IT investment, predictive analytics, spot instances, substitution of spot
instances, spot price dynamics, design science
1.2 Introduction
The cloud computing market is expanding exponentially and is expected to reach $241 billion by the year
2020 (Cheng et al. 2016). A high compounded annual growth rate of cloud computing is driven by a low
upfront investment in computing resources and enhanced operational flexibility (VanderMeer et al. 2012;
Erl et al. 2013; Bhattacherjee and Park 2014; Borgs et al. 2014; Chen and Wu 2012; Lu et al. 2016). Cloud
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computing providers like Amazon.com and Microsoft.com provide not only a traditional pay-per-use
pricing model, but they also offer an auction-based pricing model which has received significant attention
in recent research (Cheng et al. 2016; Javadi et al. 2011; Marston et al. 2011; August et al. 2014; Iyer and
Henderson 2010; Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2011) and practice (Spotinst 2017; Darrow
2015; Rodrigues 2012; Urquhart 2009; Economist 2011).
In this chapter, we focus on the auction market for cloud resources or spot instances, referred to as the spot
market. Evidence from practice shows that firms save significant computing costs by adopting spot
instances compared to traditional pay-per-use price provisioning (on-demand price), and this saving can be
on average more than 80 percent (Figure 1). Therefore, the key incentive for organizations to adopt the spot
market is to further lower their IT infrastructure costs.

Figure 1. (Color online) Cost savings from spot instances
Surprisingly, despite the significant cost saving from the provisioning of computing resources through the
spot market, the adoption of spot instances has been low (AWS 2017a; Spotinst 2017). One of the
challenges inhibiting the adoption of spot instances is its dynamic spot price which is determined by the
demand and supply of these instances in real-time (Shachar 2016). The nature of a dynamically changing
price for computing resources (see Figure 2) posits significant operational and managerial challenges for
the organizations in adopting the spot market. While the key operational challenge is to design faulttolerant software which can run on spot instances, the key managerial challenge is to estimate the future
IT investments in computing resources given the dynamic prices (Spotinst 2017).
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Note: (a) Software – Linux/UNIX, Hardware – c3.8xlarge; (b) Software – Windows, Hardware – g2.2xlarge, (c) Software – Windows, Hardware
– c3.8xlarge

Figure 2. Dynamically changing prices of spot instances in US-West region
There is scant academic research in IS and computer science that studies the appropriate methods to estimate
IT investments in adoption of the spot market and thereby provide guidance to IT managers in addressing
this key managerial challenge. The extant research has focused on providing guidance on selecting optimum
bid values by building predictive models to forecast spot prices for the next hour(s) (Song et al. 2012; Zafer
et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2013; Singh and Dutta 2015). This strand of research provides limited value for IT
investment forecasting given that a spot market auction is similar to a Vickrey style auction (Krishna 2009;
Cheng et al. 2016) wherein participants’ optimal strategy is to bid their private value or reservation price
for the computing resource (Milgrom 1989; Krishna 2009).
Organizations allocate budgets to their sub-units based on their requirements, and the budget
allocation process acts as an incentive tool to control costs within sub-units (Pollack and Zeckhauser 1996;
Govindarajan and Anthony 1998). In the case of spot instance usage, organizations face a key managerial
challenge in formulating the budget for IT investments due to the dynamically changing spot price in realtime. Due to IT managers’ inability to reliably forecast the IT investment under spot instance usage, they
tend to be averse to adopting spot market despite its lower costs (Shachar 2016).
In this chapter, we investigate whether customers substitute instances to take advantage of price
differences among similar instances and examine the price dynamics to build IT artifacts – forecasting

3

models and learning algorithm to resolve the managerial challenge associated with adoption of the cloud
spot market. More specifically, this chapter addresses the following research questions:


Do spot market customers substitute instances across operating systems, hardware types and the
locations of data centers within a region as the prices of spot instances change?



Does accounting for substitution of instances by customers in the spot market improve the performance
of forecasting models for IT investment prediction under spot instance usage?



Does accounting for the price dynamics of an instance in the spot market improve the performance of
forecasting models for IT investment prediction under spot instance usage?



Does including price dynamics of an instance along with substitution across instances improves the
performance of predictive models for IT investment forecasting under spot instance usage?



Which IT investment prediction model provides the best performance? Moreover, is the best prediction
model robust across instances with heterogeneous price volatility?

We follow a design science methodology (Hevner et al. 2004; Gregor and Hevner 2013; AWS 2017e) in
building IT artifacts – predictive models to forecast the IT investment for different durations such as a day,
a week, biweekly, and a month under spot instance usage. We build Substitution Effect Model (SEM) which
leverages the price relationship among the spot instances. Moreover, we extend the research on price
dynamics (Jank and Zhang 2011; Wang et al. 2008; Bapna et al. 2008b) and include it in the SEM model
to build our Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM). We choose a heuristic–based machine
learning approach over the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator to train our models because we observe a
high correlation among the spot prices which is a challenge for OLS estimation. We evaluate our IT artifacts
over a dataset collected from AWS for the year 2015 and by using the mean absolute percent error (MAPE)
and the root mean square error (RMSE) to compare the performance of proposed predictive models.
In a recent study related to the pricing of spot instances, Cheng et al. (2016) found that the price of
a spot instance in two different regions of AWS data centers differs significantly and the difference is
consistent over time. These price differences have been explained by difference in latency between data
4

centers located in different regions which are significantly distant from each other. However, the
distribution of AWS data centers follows a hierarchical structure. While Cheng et al. (2016) considered two
regions – US-East and US-West, and found that customers do not substitute instances across these regions,
the study does not make clear whether customers substitute instances across hardware types, operating
systems and data centers location within a region. To quantify the relationship among the prices of spot
instances, we propose a dyadic pairwise correction coefficient to examine the substitution effect across
hardware type, operating system, and data center location within a region. We build econometric models to
test the strength of substitution across instances within a region and extend the extant research (Cheng et
al., 2016) which has studied substitution across regions. We use results from econometric models to inform
our Substitution Effect model (SEM) for IT investment forecasting.
Prior research in Information Systems has studied the forecasting of clearing prices in online
auctions and has shown that inclusion of price dynamics improves the performance of the forecasting model
(Jank and Zhang, 2011; Wang et al., 2008; Bapna et al., 2008b). Jank and Zhang (2011) predict the bid
price in an eBay auction using a set of price dynamics and product features and drawing from their
approach, we conceptualize price dynamics in our context using the first derivative of the price of the spot
instances. We include price dynamics in the SEM model to build our second forecasting model – the
Substitution Effect and Dynamics model (SEDM) for IT investment forecasting.
We find strong evidence that as the clearing prices of different instances change in the AWS spot
market, customers substitute instances across data center locations, hard- ware types and operating
systems. The Substitution Effect Model (SEM) outperforms the traditional autoregressive model based on
the root mean square error (RMSE) and the mean absolute percent error (MAPE) of the prediction. The
RMSE for our Substitution Effect Model is on average 50.56 percent lower across instances compared to
the autoregressive model for one-month-ahead IT investment forecasting in the US-West region. The
mean absolute percent error (MAPE) of the Substitution Effect Model is on average 43.75 percent lower
across instances compared to the autoregressive model for one-month-ahead IT investment forecasting in
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the US-West region. Surprisingly, contrary to our initial intuition, including the price dynamics does not
provide an improvement over the Substitution Effect Model. To check the robustness of our prediction,
we clustered the instances based on their spot price volatility and performed a sensitivity analysis with
respect to price volatility. Our models perform well in predicting the IT investment with the instances of
low price volatility wherein the MAPE is just one percent for predicting the IT investment under spot
instance usage for one-month-ahead forecasting.
Our research makes following contributions to literature and practice. First, we demonstrate that
the customers using auction-based cloud resources substitute spot in- stances over three dimensions locations, hardwares, and operating systems. Moreover, we extend the cloud pricing literature (Cheng et
al., 2016) by demonstrating the substitution effect, as customers leverage price differences along
hardware, OSs, and location dimensions within a region. Second, we present two IT investment
forecasting models (IT artifacts), SEM and SEDM models, to help organizations meet their organizational
challenge of IT investment forecasting. Third, we contribute to auction forecasting literature (Jank and
Zhang, 2011; Wang et al., 2008; Bapna et al., 2008b) and demonstrate that the price dynamics feature
does not improve the performance of forecasting models in cloud auctions, which are continuous, multiunit and simultaneous.
We also contribute to practice relating to the adoption of cloud and provide guidance to
organizations to better estimate their IT investments in spot instance usage. First, the forecasting models
help practitioners to estimate their IT investments if they adopt spot instances which further reduces their
operational cost. Second, practitioners can use the forecasting models to select the appropriate spot
instances based on their price volatility and the reliability of IT investment forecasting. Finally, based on
our insights from the inter-relationship of prices of spot instances, practitioners can build spot instance
portfolio by including instances with varying degrees of substitutability.
1.3 Background
Amazon web services’ (AWS) spot instances launched in 2009 (Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al., 2013) to
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auction spare computing capacity. AWS has recently released brief details of its auction mechanism
(AWS, 2017e). Based on the description provided by AWS, the prices of spot instances are determined
dynamically based on the demand and supply of computing resources.6 The supply of computing
resources in a spot market depends on the availability of idle resources in the AWS data centers (Javadi
et al., 2011). On the other hand, demand in the spot market depends on the number of customers requesting
spot instances simultaneously at any given time in a location.
During low utilization of computing resources in data centers, especially in reserved and ondemand instance categories, the idle computing resources are moved to the spot market. However, when
the utilization of resources is high in on-demand and reserved categories, the same resources are
transferred back to maximize the cloud vendors’ revenue. This dynamic demand and supply model leads
to an efficient market, where customers can buy computing resources at a lower price compared to an ondemand pricing model. The auction model used by AWS is similar to a Vickrey-style auction (Krishna,
2009; Cheng et al., 2016); however, there is a key difference. Unlike a Vickrey auction in which multiple
units are sold at once, the AWS spot auction is a continuous auction wherein customers who lost the
auction at any time can place a higher bid request again in future time periods. To participate in the bidding
process, customers place their bid values (per unit hourly price) along with the number of spot instances
they need, the choice of operating system, and the location of the data center. If a customer’s bid value is
higher than the market price or spot price, he or she is granted spot instances for the requested time.
However, at any time when the spot price rises above the customer’s bid price, the spot instances are
terminated by AWS. To assist customers in their bidding and participation in spot market decisions, AWS
also provides archival spot price data for the past three months.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the related work followed
by model development in section 3. In section 4, we present evaluation followed by data description in
the section 5. In section 6, we present our results followed by discussion in section 7 and conclude our
chapter in section 8.
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1.4 Related Work
Our work belongs to literature in the domain of business challenges in cloud adoption and contributes to
the literature in three streams: (1) operational and managerial challenges faced by organizations adopting
auction-based pricing for cloud resources (Cheng et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2010); (2) online auction price
prediction methods (Jank and Zhang, 2011; Wang et al., 2008); and (3) predictive analytics research in
Information Systems (IS) following design science methodology (Lin et al., 2017; Bao and Datta, 2014).
One of the recent literature reviews in cloud computing has identified privacy, legal issues, cost, trust,
ethical issues, and pricing as business challenges in cloud computing adoption (Yang and Tate,
2012) and find sparse research in addressing these challenges.
Auction-based pricing models in cloud computing have received significant attention both in
academia (Cheng et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2010) and in practice (Spotinst, 2017). However, there are
operational and managerial challenges in the adoption of the spot market, which follows an auction-based
pricing model. One of the major operational challenges is the abrupt termination or preemption of spot
resources when the continuously shifting spot price increases above the customer’s bid. In the case of the
termination of a spot instance, part of the computational job already completed is lost and needs to be
repeated, increasing the job’s execution time (Yi et al. 2010) even if the application has interruptiontolerance. Techniques like checkpointing8 and migration9 may be helpful in addressing this operational
challenge (Yi et al. 2010). Apart from these techniques, Voorsluys and Buyya (2012) introduced a new
process, task duplication, to increase the interruption-tolerance of applications running on spot instances.
While these studies provide guidance to solve operational challenges, little research addresses the
managerial challenges faced by organizations using spot instances (Yang and Tate 2012) in terms of IT
investment forecasting.
Online auction prediction using price dynamics has been studied in Information Systems research
(Jank and Zhang 2011; Wang et al. 2008). Jank and Zhang (2011) presented an auction price prediction
model for predicting the market price of an eBay auction using a price dynamics feature and demonstrated
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that the price dynamics features improve the forecasting algorithm’s performance. Wang et al. (2008)
build a dynamic forecasting system to predict prices of an ongoing auction in real-time. Their model
improves prediction performance by including in real-time the changing dynamics of price throughout the
auction. In this chapter, we extend this literature which has focused on predicting prices in a single item,
time-bound, and one-time auction to predicting IT investment in a multi-unit, continuous, and
simultaneous auction under spot instance usage.
The majority of the studies in the spot market pricing literature have focused on forecasting a
next-hour spot price to solve the operational challenges of next-hour bidding. (Singh and Dutta 2015;
Javadi et al. 2011). Wallace et al. (2013) provide short-term price predictions using a neural network and
have considered price forecasting for different in- stance types, excluding the role of operating systems.
The prediction algorithm by Wallace et al. (2013) is limited to one-step-ahead predictions at any point in
time and requires re- training of the model before every prediction, a computationally expensive process.
Javadi et al. (2013a) model inter-price time (time duration between two consecutive spot price changes
during which the price remains constant) using a mixture of Gaussian distributions, and provide a
predictive model for spot instances running on a Linux platform in two of the AWS data centers. In a
recent study, Singh and Dutta (2015) built a novel autoregressive model for the short-term prediction of
spot prices. Since the AWS auction platform has not released complete details of its auction mechanism,
Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al. (2013) reverse-engineer the spot price to uncover the auction algorithm. This
stream of research has focused on predicting the spot price for the next hour(s); it has limited application
in forecasting the spot prices over the longer duration required for IT investment forecasting. One of the
key assumptions in these studies is that the prices of spot instances are independent of each other.
However, the research by Cheng et al. (2016) point towards a need for further research to understand the
price relationship among the spot instances. In this chapter, we fill this gap in the literature.
Spot markets have been used in other utility-based industries such as in electricity (Wallace et al.
2013). There are key similarities and differences between these two markets. Similar to the electricity
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market, the cloud market is oligopolistic: only a small set of big companies such as google.com,
amazon.com, and microsoft.com own the majority of market share. Moreover, like electricity services,
any unused cloud resources are a direct loss for the provider. However, there are key differences between
these markets. First, the time required to increase or decrease the production of cloud computing resources
is much smaller compared to that of electricity resources (Wallace et al. 2013). Second, the aggregation
of cloud computing resources from different data centers is technically easier than an aggregation of
electricity resources from different power grids. Third, unlike consumers in the electricity market,
consumers of the cloud spot market can obtain resources from multiple locations or data centers at the
same time. Given these similarities and differences in these two markets, our forecasting models are also
informed by multiple forecasting techniques used for electricity spot price forecasting. These techniques
include autoregressive models-based forecasting (Nogales et al. 2002) and supervised learning-based
forecasting techniques such as Neural networks (Iyer et al. 2003). Nogales et al. (2002) provide a
comparative study of different forecasting techniques for electricity price forecasting in the extant
literature and demonstrate that the autoregressive model outperforms other existing techniques. Drawing
from the high performance demonstrated by autoregressive models in the electricity spot market, we also
build and extend autoregressive models to predict IT investment under spot instance usage.
Some of the recent works in IS have investigated the pricing challenges from the cloud vendors’
perspective (Du et al. 2012). While customers assume that cloud providers have unlimited resources, cloud
vendors absorb the majority of the risk related to the uncertain demands of cloud resources, including high
underutilization of resources in off-peak hours. Du et al. (2012) propose a dynamic forward contract
mechanism for efficient risk hedging for the cloud vendors and evaluate their proposal using a simulation.
Unlike Du et al. (2012) who focus on cloud vendors, our study focuses on cloud customers’ and presents
IT artifacts to mitigate their managerial challenges.
In a recent study relating to the spot market, Cheng et al. (2016) examine the impact of Internet
latency on the spot price difference among the instances in two different regions, the US-East and US-
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West, and demonstrate that the customers prefer the US- West data center over the US-East data center
for identical resources. This is because the Internet latency in the US-East data center is consistently higher
than in the US-West data center; the higher latency hurts customers running latency-sensitive applications.
However, the impact of the latency may not be of concern for customers migrating resources within a
region. Our work explores the spot price relationships among the instances in different zones within a
region. We also contribute by investigating the spot price relationship among instances having similar
hardware and operating systems.
Recent research in predictive analytics in design science research focuses on building predictive
models (Lin et al. 2017; Bao and Datta 2014) – a design science artifact (Hevner et al. 2004) to solve
wicked or challenging business problems (Ketter et al. 2016; Rittel and Webber 1973). Such work has
drawn increased attention from researchers in IS (Hevner and Chatterjee 2010). In the recent research, Lin
et al. (2017) built a Bayesian multitask learning approach to predict patients’ risks of adverse health events
using EHR data. Bao and Datta (2014) present a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) based model to predict
risk disclosure in 10-K forms. Apart from building models from archival data, recent studies have also
examined crowd-based predictions using prediction market wherein similar to stock markets, customers
trade outcome of different events (Chen et al. 2017). Breuker et al. (2016) present probabilistic models to
streamline organizational business processes by helping decision makers predict the probabilities of
undesirable future business events. Geva et al. (2017) build a model predicting offline sales using data
from Google searches, Internet discussion forums, and social media sites. Drawing from this stream of
literature of predictive modeling in IS, we contribute by building IT artifacts – forecasting models and an
algorithm, which help organizations forecast the IT investment in computing resources if they adopt the
spot market.
Digital infrastructure is an important category of IT artifacts, defined as “the basic information
technologies and organizational structures, along with related services and facilities necessary for an
enterprise or industry to function” (Tilson et al. 2010, p.1). Cloud computing, especially its Infrastructure-
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as-a-Service (IaaS) delivery model, is one of the contemporary topics in the area of digital infrastructure
research (Tilson et al. 2010). However, there is a paucity of research investigating the digital infrastructure
in Information Systems (Tilson et al. 2010). Our work also contributes to much-need digital infrastructure
research focusing on cloud computing resource provisioning (Yang and Tate 2012).
1.5 Model Development
We present two models, the Substitution Effect Model (SEM) and the Substitution Effect and Dynamics
Model (SEDM), for the IT investment forecasting for organizations using spot instances. We first explore
the inter-relationship among the prices of spot instances over three dimensions: hardware type, platform
type, and location of the data center. Leveraging this price inter-relationship, we build our first model to
predict IT investment under spot instance usage, and we call this Substitution Effect Model – (SEM).
Recent studies by Jank and Zhang (2011) and others (Wang et al. 2008; Bapna et al. 2008b) have
demonstrated that price dynamics also play a crucial role in predicting the market price and price evolution
during an online auction. Drawing from this extant literature which has used the rate of the change of the
price or velocity of the price as the price dynamics feature, we build our second model, the Substitution
Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM). This model leverages price features based on both a price
substitution effect and price dynamics to predict the IT investment under spot instance usage.
In order to build predictive models for IT investment, we estimate the IT investment under the
spot instance usage as the sum of the future spot prices for any spot instance over a duration such as a day,
𝑡0+𝑛

a week, biweekly, or a month. More specifically, we estimate the IT investment as ∫𝑡0

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 of an

instance with a spot price 𝑥𝑡 over a duration of 𝑛 hours starting at 𝑡 = 𝑡0 . Following the literature (Singh
and Dutta 2015; Nogales et al. 2002), we first build an autoregressive model to predict the IT investment
under spot instance usage, then extend it to include a substitution effect in the SEM model and, in the end,
include price dynamics along with a substitution effect in the SEDM model.
Autoregressive model
We present the autoregressive model to predict the IT investment under spot instance usage in Equation
12

𝑡+𝑛

(1) wherein 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 represents the price of the spot instance at time (𝑡 − 𝑖), and ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the IT

investment for a spot instance whose price is represented by 𝑥𝑡 at time 𝑡 over a period of 𝑛 hours.
Moreover, 𝛽 ′ represents a constant and 𝛽𝑖 represents the weights for 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 .
𝑖=𝑝

𝑡+𝑛

∫

′

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖

𝑡

(1)

𝑖=0

Our implementation of the autoregressive model is different from its previous implementations in cloud
computing research which have used such models for the next-hour spot price prediction (Singh and Dutta
2015; Zhao et al. 2012) to help customers bid for spot instances. Instead, we build an autoregressive model
to predict the long-term IT investment under spot instance usage. Unlike the next-hour spot price
prediction, the pre- diction of IT investment is immensely important to IT managers. The spot price is
highly volatile for short periods of time and the predictive models for the next-hour price do not achieve
high prediction accuracy (Singh and Dutta 2015); for a longer duration under spot instance usage, the IT
investment may not be significantly impacted by short, infrequent, and volatile price changes. Moreover,
our empirical approach is focused on predicting the IT investment, unlike extant literature which focuses
on predicting the next-hour bidding price.
Substitution effect in cloud spot market
In economics, the substitution effect is defined in terms of change in the consumption of a good in response
to a change in the price of another good (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Mankiw 2014). If two goods are
substitutes and if the price of one of the goods goes up, then the price of the “substitute” good also goes
up (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Mankiw 2014). Drawing from this economics literature, we define
Substitution Effect in the context of spot instances as a phenomenon in which the price of one spot instance
is influenced by the price of the other spot instance(s), such that the increase (decrease) in the price of one
spot instance increases (decreases) the price of the other spot instance (s) which customers may substitute
for the first spot instance.
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Figure 3. (Color online) Substitution effect over three dimensions
We observe a substitution effect (Figure 3) in spot prices because over time, customers have the flexibility
to choose different spot instances having different hardware types, operating systems, and locations, to
take advantage of the price differences among the substitute spot instances. In order to study the
substitution effect, we first conceptualize a measure of substitution across these three dimensions and
describe them as follows.


Hardware substitution: Hardware substitution refers to customers changing from one hardware type
to another, as several hardware types are compatible with the various OSs available in the AWS
system. The hardware substitution may be because customers take advantage of price differences
across the spot instances. There are various hardware capacities offered to the cloud customers within
a hardware category. The customers may migrate their applications within a hardware category due
to the homogeneity of the hard- ware properties to take advantage of the price difference among the
spot instances. Because customers can substitute hardware, the prices of spot instances within a
hardware cate- gory influence each other. For example, two spot instances with Linux operating
system and hardware types – m2.xlarge and m2.2xlarge in the location us-west-2c are hardware
substitutes (see Figure 3) because both instances belongs to same hardware category – m2, though
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they have different capacities (xlarge and 2xlarge). We can observe their price correlation in Figure
ℎ
3. Formally, we define hardware substitution as 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
between two spot instances 𝑖 and 𝑗.
ℎ
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
= {

1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 == 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Here, 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖ℎ is equal to 1 if spot instances 𝑖 and 𝑗 are hardware substitutes of each other, otherwise
it is equal to 0.


Operating systems substitution: The substitution of spot instances by customers based on the
compatibility of operating systems is termed Operating Systems (OS) substitution. As of September
26, 2017, Amazon Web Services offered customers six OSs, three of which we consider in this study:
Linux/UNIX, Windows, and SUSE Linux. Since a wide variety of applications and programming
languages are available on these three operating systems, customers can migrate their applications
from one operating system to another based on the availability and the difference in prices of the spot
instance offered on different operating systems. For example, the applications developed using
programming languages such as JAVA, Python, Groovy, Scala, etc., can run seamlessly on any of the
three operating systems. Therefore, these applications can be migrated easily from one operating
system to another. For example, customers might choose the location of us-west-2b and a hardware
type of m3.2xlarge, but they can then choose to use either Linux or Windows as their OS. Further, we
𝑜
represent operating system substitution as 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
between two instances 𝑖 and 𝑗 which is

defined as follows.
𝑜
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
= {

1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑆𝑖 == 𝑂𝑆𝑗
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝑜
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
is 1 if two instances can be substituted based on operating systems, otherwise it is 0.



Location substitution: The substitution of spot instances by customers having identical hardware and
operating systems in different zones within a region is termed Location substitution. Previous
researchers have investigated the price difference between identical spot instances in different regions
(US-East and US-West) (Cheng et al. 2016). Cheng et al. (2016) demonstrate that the difference in
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the latency to access resources in different regions is an important factor which inhibits a customer’s
substitution of resources across different regions. However, where the research by Cheng et al. (2016)
focuses on the location at the region level, we focus on a more granular measurement of location, the
zones. For example, the US-West region of AWS is divided into five zones. There are multiple
differences in substituting resources across different zones within a region, compared to substituting
resources in zones across different regions. First, zones within a region are closer to each other
compared to zones across different regions. Therefore, the effect of latency on price difference may
not be significant among the zones within a region. Second, there is no additional charge for data
transfer across the zones within a region. However, the customer needs to pay for data transfer across
different zones belonging to different regions. Therefore, based on the law of one price (Isard 1977),
we can argue that the customers may substitute spot instances across different zones within a region
based on resource availability and price difference. We represent location substitution as
𝑙
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
which is defined as follows.
𝑙
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
= {

1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 == 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑗
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝑙
Here, 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
is equal to 1 if two instances are in two different zones within a regions are

substitutes, otherwise it is equal to 0.
Exploratory analysis of Substitution effect
We investigate the impact of the three substitution dimensions on the substitution effect among spot
instances. We measure the substitution effect between the two spot instances by taking the co-variance of
the prices of these two spot instances. The choice of the co-variance to measure the dyadic relation over
correlation is driven by characteristics of the spot price data wherein prices of the certain spot instances
are constant over the observed time period. For these instances, the pairwise correlation is not defined.
The co-variance of the price of the two spot instances 𝑖 and 𝑗 is measured by 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 as given in Equation (2)
wherein 𝑛 represents the number of price observations for each of the instances and 𝑥𝑖,𝑘 and 𝑥𝑗,𝑘 represent
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the spot price at time 𝑘. Moreover, 𝑥̅𝑖 and 𝑥̅𝑗 represent the sample mean of 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 respectively.
𝑘=𝑛

1
𝑌𝑖,𝑗 =
∑(𝑥𝑖,𝑘 − 𝑥̅𝑖 )(𝑥𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑥̅𝑗 )
𝑛−1
𝑘=1

To examine the effect of the three substitution dimensions mentioned on the price co- variance, we perform
the econometric analysis with co-variance between the price of spot instances as our dependent variable
and three dimensions of substitution as independent variables. We first build a linear model as shown in
Equation (3).
ℎ
𝑜
𝑙
𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂ℎ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝜂𝑜 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝜂𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑗

Here, 𝜂ℎ , 𝜂𝑜 , and 𝜂𝑙 represent the weights of the hardware, operating systems, and location substitutions
which contribute to the price co-variances among the spot instances. 𝜖𝑖,𝑗 represents the independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) error across the pairwise co- variance (i, j). Moreover, 𝜂0 is a constant. Before
performing the regression, we examine the correlation among the independent variables and present it in
Table 1. We can observe from Table 1 that there is no high correlation (the highest correlation between
operating systems and location is -0.64).
Table 1. Correlation matrix
Operating Systems

Hardware

Operating Systems

1

Hardware

-0.236

1.000

Location

-0.642

-0.147

Location

1.000

We used ordinary least square (OLS) estimator and feasible generalized least square estimator
(FGLS) to estimate Equation (3) and present the results in Table 2. We also robustly test the regression with
other specifications where we take the absolute value of the dyadic co-variance between the prices of spot
instances. Model 1 represents the OLS estimates for the regression with dyadic co-variance as the dependent
variable. We can see from the table that all three dimensions (operating systems, hardware types, and
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locations of data centers) have positive and significant relationships with the dyadic co-variance. Model 2
presents the results of the OLS estimation with the absolute value of the dyadic co-variance as a dependent
variable. Please note that the co-variance may be negative as well.
Robustness test
To robustly check the OLS estimates for heteroscedasticity, we conducted the Breusch-Pagan / CookWeisberg test for heteroscedasticity (Baum et al., 2003). One of the assumptions of OLS estimation is that
the residual either has uniform variance or is homoscedastic. We performed the Breusch-Pagan / CookWeisberg test for both Model 1 and Model 2. The null hypothesis in the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg
test states that the residual is homoscedastic or the error term has constant variance. The result for the
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for Model 1 is significant (chi-square= 205412.17, p<0.001), so we
reject the null hypothesis that the error is homoscedastic. Similarly, in Model 2, the result for the BreuschPagan / Cook-Weisberg test is significant (chi-square= 206635.93, p<0.001), so we reject the null
hypothesis for homoscedasticity or constant variance of the residual. To correct for heteroscedasticity, we
performed the feasible generalized least square (FGLS) model (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). The FGLS
model is robust in the case of a heteroscedastic condition. Model 3 and Model 4 present the heteroscedastic
robust estimates using the FGLS model for a dependent variable (dyadic co-variance and absolute value of
dyadic co-variance respectively). We can observe from the table that the relationship of the operating
systems, hardware, and location is positive and significant with the dyadic co-variance and absolute value
of dyadic co-variance. From the above results, we can conclude that the operating system, hardware type,
and location of the data center have positive and significant relationships with the dyadic co-variance among
the price of the spot instances. This demonstrates that the customers substitute spot instances in all three
dimensions (operating system, hardware type, and location).
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Table 2. Regression results
Model (1) -OLS

Model (2) - OLS

Model (3) - FGLS

Model (4) - FGLS

Cov
0.00289**

abs(Cov)
0.00355**

Cov
0.00289**

abs(Cov)
0.00358**

(0.00105)

(0.00105)

(0.00108)

(0.00108)

0.04288***

0.03946***

0.04200***

0.03860***

(0.00148)

(0.00148)

(0.00147)

(0.00146)

0.00363**

0.00324***

0.00356***

0.00319**

(0.00098)

(0.00097)

(0.00100)

(0.00099)

N

77034

77034

77034

77034

R-square

0.0123

0.0104

0.0123

0.0103

Adj-R

0.0123

0.0103

0.0122

0.0102

Variables
DV
OS

Hardware

Location

Substitution Effect Model (SEM)
In the Substitution Effect Model (SEM), apart from the past prices of the spot instance, we also include the
past prices of other spot instances which can be substituted on one of the three dimensions – location of
data center, hardware type, and operating systems. We present our Substitution Effect Model in Equation
(4).
𝑡+𝑛

∫
𝑡

𝑝

𝑝

𝑝

𝑝

ℎ
𝑜
𝑙
𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽 ′ + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖ℎ 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑜 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=1

𝑖=1 ∀ℎ

𝑖=1 ∀𝑜

(4)

𝑖=1 ∀𝑙

ℎ
𝑜
In Equation (4), 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 represents the past prices of the spot instance at time (𝑡 − 𝑖). Here, 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
, 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
, and
𝑙
𝑥𝑡−𝑖
represent the prices of the set of instances which can be substituted for the target spot instance 𝑖 which

customers may choose to substitute based on the hardware type, operating system, and location of the spot
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ℎ
𝑜
instance at time (𝑡 − 𝑖). 𝛽𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖ℎ , 𝛽𝑖𝑜 , and 𝛽𝑖𝑙 represent the set of coefficients or weights for 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 , 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
, 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
,
𝑡+𝑛

𝑙
and 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
respectively, ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the IT investment for a spot instance with price 𝑥𝑡 over 𝑛 hours.

Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM)
We extend the research on the dynamics model used for online auction forecasting (Jank and Zhang 2011;
Bapna et al. 2008b) and extend our SEM model to build the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model
(SEDM).
Dynamics Model:
Dynamics-based models in the extant literature (Jank and Zhang 2011; Bapna et al. 2008b) have shown that
the price of an auction can be predicted accurately by including price dynamics features. Jank and Zhang
(2011) analyzed the clearing price of items over eBay to demonstrate that the price dynamics features
reliably predict the auction clearing price in e-commerce. The rate of change of the price represents the
price dynamics feature. Other studies in the field of Functional Data Analysis (Ramsay and Silverman 2002)
highlight the role and predictive power of dynamics features in predictive models. The rate of change or
dynamics plays a crucial role in determining and predicting the rapid changes in price of the spot instances.
Drawing from the prior research, we build a Dynamics Model by including first derivative of the
spot price or price velocity in the autoregressive model and predict the IT investment under spot instance
usage.
𝑝

𝑡+𝑛

∫

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽 ′ + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘

𝑡

𝑖=1

𝑑𝑥𝑡
𝑑𝑡

(5)

We represent the IT investment of the spot instances in terms of prices in past durations along with the rate
of change of the price similar to Jank and Zhang (2011). In Equation (5),

𝑑𝑥𝑡
𝑑𝑡

represents the rate of change
𝑝

in the price of the spot instance at time t. We include the autoregressive part, ∑𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 , which represents
the past price of spot instance. 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑘 represent the coefficient of the autoregressive variables and price
𝑡+𝑛

dynamics variable respectively. ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the IT investment under spot instance usage.
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We build our Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM) by including the price dynamics
parameters based on studies by Jank and Zhang (2011) and Bapna et al. (2000). We present our Substitution
𝑡+𝑛

Effect and Dynamics Model in Equation (6). In Equation 6, ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the IT investment under

spot instance usage, 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 represents the price of the target spot instance in previous 𝑖 duration and

𝑑𝑥𝑡
𝑑𝑡

ℎ
𝑜
𝑙
represents the price velocity of the target spot instance. 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
, 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
, and 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
represent the substitution effect

on hardware type, operating systems, and location dimensions.
𝑡+𝑛

∫
𝑡

𝑝

𝑝

𝑝

𝑝

𝑑𝑥𝑡
ℎ
𝑜
𝑙
𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽 ′ + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽𝑘
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖ℎ 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑜 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙 𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑑𝑡
𝑖=1

𝑖=1 ∀ℎ

𝑖=1 ∀𝑜

(5)

𝑖=1 ∀𝑙

Measuring IT investment for spot instance usage
The spot price is a continuous measurement, however, similar to a study by Cheng et al. (2016), we have
sampled the spot price hourly by taking the latest price within the past hour. For the purpose of modeling,
𝑡+𝑛

∫𝑡

𝑗=𝑛
𝑥𝑡+𝑗 𝑑𝑡 is computed as ∑𝑗=0 𝑥𝑡+𝑗 where 𝑥𝑡+𝑗 represents the hourly spot price of an instance at

time (𝑡 + 𝑗). We estimate our proposed models using a novel predictive algorithm presented in Algorithm
1 in the subsection below.
Predictive Algorithm
We present our heuristic algorithm for the estimation of the proposed models in Algorithm 1. We choose
the heuristic algorithm over the statistical estimator such as the ordinary least square (OLS) for the
following reasons (Bottou 2010). First, our goal is to predict the IT investment instead of performing a
statistical inference. Second, the OLS time complexity increases exponentially with the increase in the
number of variables. In our case, the number of independent variables in the forecasting model is large.
Research has pointed out that the OLS estimator is not suited for estimating a regression with a large number
of independent variables (Bottou 2010). Third, in the case of perfect multi-collinearity where one
independent variable is a function of other independent variables, OLS estimates are not defined. In our
case, there are multiple spot instances whose prices do not change over time; this presents a case for perfect

21

multi-collinearity in our models. To overcome these limitations of the OLS, we choose to build our heuristic
algorithm by following the approach by Bottou (2010) for learning our proposed models.
We first determine the cost function 𝐽(𝛽𝑖 ) which is the sum of the square of prediction error. 𝛽𝑖
𝑡+𝑛

represents the weights or the coefficients of the features in Equations (4) and (6). ∫𝑡
𝑡+𝑛

actual value of the IT investment for a duration of 𝑛 hours. ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the

′′

𝑥𝑡 (𝛽𝑗 ) 𝑑𝑡 represents the predicted value

of the IT investment for the next 𝑛 hours. The proposed algorithm is an iterative process. In each iteration,
we adjust the weights or coefficients of the features 𝛽𝑗 to minimize the overall prediction error.
Algorithm 1. Proposed Algorithm
For each model
{
Calculate the cost function:
𝐽(𝛽𝑖 ) =

1
2𝑁

𝑡+𝑛

∑𝑚
𝑖=1 (∫𝑡

𝑡+𝑛

𝑥𝑡 𝑑𝑡 − ∫𝑡

2

𝑡+𝑛

𝑥𝑡′′ (𝛽𝑗 )𝑑𝑡 ) ; where ∫𝑡

𝑥𝑡′′ (𝛽𝑗 )𝑑𝑡 is the fitted value and N is

the sample size
Repeat until convergence{
𝛽𝑗 ≔ 𝛽𝑗 − 𝛼

𝜕𝐽(𝛽𝑗 )
, ∀𝛽𝑗
𝜕 𝛽𝑗

}}
Duration of forecasting
We build models to predict the IT investment for four different durations: one day, one week, bi-weekly,
and one month. First, the daily IT investment for an instance is defined as the sum of the hourly prices of
𝑗=24

an instance for the next 24 hours. It is represented as ∑𝑗=0 𝑥𝑡+𝑗 where 𝑥𝑡+𝑗 represents the spot price of an
instance at the time (𝑡 + 𝑗). Similarly, we define the weekly IT investment over a spot instance as the sum
𝑗=168

of the hourly prices of an instance for next 168 hours. The weekly IT investment is defined as ∑𝑗=0

𝑥𝑡+𝑗 .

We define the biweekly (once in two weeks) IT investment as the sum of hourly spot prices for next 360
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𝑗=360
hours. The biweekly IT investment is represented as ∑𝑗=0 𝑥𝑡+𝑗 . Finally, we define the monthly IT

investment as the sum of hourly spot prices for the next 720 hours and the monthly IT investment is
𝑗=720

represented as ∑𝑗=0

𝑥𝑡+𝑗 .

1.6 Evaluation
We have use two evaluation metrics – mean absolute percent error (MAPE) and root mean square error
(RMSE) to evaluate the performance of our IT investment forecasting models. Moreover, we perform the
sensitivity analysis of our IT investment model over price volatility measured using coefficient of variation.
Evaluation criteria
Mean absolute percent error (MAPE) represents the percentage error of the predicted values compared to
the actual values. The MAPE for the IT investment forecasting is defined in the Equation (7).
𝑡+𝑛

∑∀𝑖

|∫𝑡

𝑡+𝑛

′′
𝑥𝑡,𝑛
(𝛽𝑗 )𝑑𝑡 − ∫𝑡
𝑡+𝑛

∫𝑡

𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑛 =

𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑑𝑡

𝑁

𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑑𝑡|

)
(7)

In Equation (7), 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑛 represents mean absolute percent error of IT investment forecasting for the
𝑡+𝑛

duration of n hours over spot instances. ∫𝑡
𝑡+𝑛

model and ∫𝑡

′′
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
(𝛽𝑗 )𝑑𝑡 represents the IT investment predicted using the

𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑑𝑡 represents the actual IT investment for the same prediction duration. Finally, N

represents the number of spot instances. We normalize the prediction error with number of spot instances
(N) to obtain average 𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑛 across spot instances. We should note here that MAPE is unit independent
(i.e., its unit is percentage). We use root mean square error (RMSE) as our second evaluation criteria to
examine the performance of our proposed IT investment forecasting models. We have defined the RMSE
for a duration of n hours in the Equation (8). The unit of RMSE is same as the unit of the dependent variable,
i.e., in our case, the unit of RMSE is USD. Similar to MAPE, we also normalize the RMSE over spot
instances to obtain the average RMSE over multiple spot instances. Here, N represents the number of
instances under study.
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𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑛 =

√∑∀𝑖 (∫𝑡+𝑛 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑡

′′

𝑡+𝑛

(𝛽𝑗 )𝑑𝑡 − ∫𝑡

2

𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑑𝑡)

𝑁

Sensitivity analysis
We performed sensitivity analysis to test our prediction model rigorously. The prediction accuracy of our
IT investment forecasting models may be sensitive to the volatility or variation in the spot price. There are
multiple measures of the volatility used in the literature (Pinches and Kinney 1971) to measure variation in
a time series data. Some of the widely used measures are variance, standard deviation and coefficient of
variation. The coefficient of variation is a better measure of volatility compared to variance and standard
deviation because the coefficient of variation includes standard deviation and normalizes it with the mean
of the data sample. We have defined coefficient of variation of the spot prices in the Equation (9).
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑋𝑡 ) =

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑋𝑡 )
𝜇

𝑁
2
In the above Equation (9), 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑋) = √1/𝑁 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝑥𝑡 − 𝜇) and 𝜇 = 1/𝑁 ∑𝑖=1 𝑥𝑡 . The

𝑥𝑡 represents the price of a spot instance at time t and N represents the number of observations for hourly
price of each of the spot instances (N= 8760). We further take the median of the coefficient of variations of
spot instances to categorize into low and high volatility. This approach of splitting a continuous variable
and transforming into categorical variable is termed in the literature as median split (MacCallum et al.,
2002).
1.7 Data
We present the data collection, selection and pre-processing, including descriptive statistics, in this section.
We collected data for all 399 spot instances available in US-West region, over a period of one year (January
to December, 2015). This data consists of continuously varying spot prices offered by Amazon Web
Services (AWS).
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Data collection setup
The details of the parameters which are collected in the raw data over time are presented in Table 3. The
data collected represents the changes in the spot price of each spot instance. If there is no change in the spot
price of an instance during a time period, then the spot price is constant and equal to its last observed value.
In this study, we narrow the scope of the data on operating systems, regions, and hardware in the following
ways. Although AWS provides 6 operating systems (SUSE Linux, SUSE Linux (VPC), Windows,
Windows (VPC), and Linux/UNIX, Linux/UNIX (VPC)), we exclude the three Virtual Private Cloud
(VPC) operating systems (SUSE Linux (VPC), Windows (VPC), and Linus/UNIX (VPC)), because
companies using these may choose to create a private cloud inside a public cloud such as AWS if the
organizations need higher security. In this study, we also consider a single region, US-West, since the
substitution effect is likely to be applicable within a region but not across regions (Cheng et al., 2016). In
the 5 zones of the US-West region, there are 28 different hardware types available, as of 2015.
Table 3. Details of attributes in raw data
Variable

Details

Price

Price of spot instance

Datetime

Date and time

Hardware type

Hardware type or instance type

Operating systems

Operating system running on the instance

Location

Location of the datacenter at zone level
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Figure 4. (Color online) Data collection and processing setup pipeline
Data processing
Figure 4 depicts the data collection pipeline. We used AWS web APIs to collect the spot prices of instances
at regular intervals. AWS provides data for the previous two months at any time. The data collected is
stored in a flat file system. We follow a data aggregation technique similar to that used by Cheng et al.
(2016) and aggregate the data at the second level to an hour level by taking the latest price change within
the previous hour. Since the data collected from the AWS provides the price change, we repeat the price of
the previous hour for the current hour if there is no change in the spot price for the current hour. We created
a separate table for each of the spot instances for the analysis and store them in a relational database for
further modeling.
Descriptive statistics
In this section, we present descriptive statistics of the prices of spot instances over different substitution
dimensions (operating systems, hardware categories, and location or zones). We present the number of
instances, minimum price, maximum price, average price, and price variation of the spot instance over a
period of one year averaged over the instances.
In Table 4, we present the availability of the spot instances over three different operating systems
in the US-West region. These operating systems include SUSE Linux, Windows, and Linux/UNIX. We can
observe from Table 4 that the spot instances are uniformly available over different operating systems, i.e.,
AWS offers spot instances nearly equally on all three operating systems. Moreover, since each of the spot
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instances has a different hardware configuration, it also shows that the spot instances’ hardware types are
equally compatible with the different operating systems. For spot instance running the Windows operating
system, the average price and minimum price are higher than with SUSE Linux and Linux/UNIX. One
plausible explanation is that the Windows operating system requires an additional license cost compared to
open source software such as Linux and its variants like SUSE Linux. However, for spot instances running
Linux/UNIX, we observe, quite surprisingly, that the maximum price is higher than for spot instances
running Windows and SUSE Linux. This shows that demand for Linux/UNIX is higher than its supply
within short durations, unlike the other two operating systems. This higher demand for Linux/UNIX
operating systems, with respect to its lower supply, is also visible in its higher price variation. For spot
instances running on Linux/UNIX operating systems, the average price variation is higher compared to
those on SUSE Linux and Windows.
Table 4. Distribution of spot instances over operating systems
Operating

#instances

Minimum

Maximum

Average

Price

Volatility

SUSE Linux

134

0.007

1.402

0.282

0.083

High(0.458)

Windows

131

0.006

10.848

0.374

0.215

Low(0.214)

Systems
Linux/UNIX

134

price
0.003

price
20.831

price
0.219

variation
0.444

(CV)
High(1.41)

Table 5 presents the 28 different hardware types available in the US-West region. The name of a hardware
type provides two important pieces of information, hardware category and hardware capacity, separated by
a dot symbol. For example, “c1.medium” hardware belongs to the “c1” hardware category and has
“medium” capacity. The majority of the hardware categories offer 15 different spot instances based on
different operating systems and availability zones or data centers. However, not all of the specialized
hardware categories are offered in all locations or on all operating systems. For example, cc2.8xlarge
belongs to a specialized hardware category for cluster computing with the highest capacity, 8x, which has
only 9 different instances available. Similarly, hi1.4xlarge belongs to a high I/O hardware type which has
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only 6 different instances available in the US-West region on different operating systems. Finally,
cr1.8xlarge belongs to a specialized hardware category for cluster networking with the highest capacity
(8xlarge) and has only 6 different instances available on different operating systems and availability zones.
From Appendix 2, we can observe that specialized hardware categories with a higher capacity such as cr1,
cc2, and hi1, are offered in fewer instances compared to generic hardware categories such as m1 and m3.
Compared to other hardware categories, cr1, r3, and c3 have higher mini- mum prices across instances.
The t1.micro hardware category has the lowest average price across instances compared to all other
hardware categories. One plausible explanation is that the t1.micro hardware category has the minimum
hardware capacity and is offered by AWS under its free tier, i.e., new customers can use the t1.micro
hardware type from an on-demand instance category for free. The c1.medium hardware category has the
highest maximum price (20 USD) across instances, compared to other hardware categories. However, the
hardware category cc2.8xlarge has the highest average price across instances compared to other hardware
categories. The hardware category c3.8xlarge has the highest price volatility compared to instances in
other hardware categories.
Table 5. Distribution of spot instances over different regions
Location

#instances

Minimum

Maximum

Average

Price

Volatility

us-west-1b

75

0.003

20.000

0.356

0.597

High(0.736)

us-west-1c
(Zones)
us-west-2a

75
83

0.003
price
0.003

19.120
price
15.000

0.286
price
0.264

0.134
variation
0.098

High(0.746)
(CV)
High(0.695)

us-west-2b

83

0.003

15.000

0.266

0.133

High(0.642)

us-west-2c

83

0.003

16.800

0.289

0.298

High(0.678)

Table 6 presents the availability of spot instances in the five zones within the US- West region. These
zones are further grouped into sub-regions 1 and 2. We can observe from Table 6 that the spot instances
are equally available in the different zones within each of the sub-regions. However, the number of
instances in the us-west-2 sub-region is slightly higher (83 spot instances) than in the us-west-1 sub-region
(75 spot instances). The minimum price across instances in all of the zones is identical (0.003 USD) which
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is the price of the free tier hardware t1.micro (see Table 5). However, the maximum price and price
variation across instances in sub-region-1 are higher than in sub-region-2. Figure 5 depicts the distribution
of the spot price volatility. We can observe that a larger majority of the spot instances have lower volatility
in the range of [0, 0.5]. The median value of the coefficient of the variation is 0.329 USD, which we
further use to categorize instances using a median split.
1.8 Results
We have evaluated our two IT investment prediction models on the real-world spot price data from the
US-West region for the year 2015. Our proposed IT investment prediction models outperform the
autoregressive model, as we can see from the root mean square error (RMSE) and mean absolute percent
error (MAPE) results, consistently for multiple durations of forecast, ranging from one day to one month.
Moreover, contrary to our initial intuition and the extant literature (Wang et al. 2008), the model with the
Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM) provides minor improvement over the Substitution
Effect Model. We discuss our findings in detail in the following subsections.

Figure 5. Price volatility distribution of spot instances
Performance comparison of proposed models
We evaluated our proposed models only in the US-West region; we selected a single region instead of
multiple regions for the following reasons. First there is an added cost across regions. When customers
migrate resources from one zone to another zone within a region, there is no additional network cost, but
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if they migrate the resources across regions, customers pay for the data transfer. Second, there is a
significant latency difference among the zones in different regions (Cheng et al. 2016). We chose the USWest region because it is a heavily used AWS region globally (Spotinst 2017) and because it has been
considered in the previous literature as well (Cheng et al. 2016).
In Tables 7, 8, 9,and 10, we compare the performances of four models: our pro- posed Substitution
Effect Model (SEM) and the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM), and two existing
techniques, the autoregressive model and the dynamics model, for prediction of IT investment for one
day, one week, biweekly, and one month duration respectively. We can clearly observe from these tables
that the performances of both the SEM model and the SEDM model are better than those of the existing
autoregressive techniques. Moreover, the performances of the SEM and SEDM models improve compared
to autoregressive and dynamics models, with increase in duration of the IT investment forecasting.
Table 6. Forecasting of IT investment for one day
US west region
Models
Autoregressive model
Substitution
Effect model

Median

Average

MAPE
(25 pc)

0.01

0.07

0

0.2

0.17

0.02

0.28

0

0.62

1.38

0.01

0.11

0

0.28

0.35

0.03

0.27

0

0.59

0.73

0.01

0.07

0

0.2

0.17

0.02

0.28

0

0.62

1.38

0.01

0.11

0

0.28

0.35

0.03

0.27

0

0.59

0.73

(90 pc)

SD

RMSE
Median Average (25 pc) (90 pc)

SD

Dynamics Model

Substitution Effect
and Dynamics Model

In Table 7, we can observe that the prediction of the Substitution Effect Model per- forms similarly to the
existing autoregressive model and dynamics model, based on the median mean absolute percent error
across instances. However, the average mean absolute percent error and root mean square error are slightly
higher for the Substitution Effect Model compared to the autoregressive model and the dynamics model.
One plausible ex- planation for this slightly lower performance of the Substitution Effect Model compared
to the autoregressive model is that the customers using spot instances wait for a sufficiently longer time
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(more than a day) to decide to substitute the spot instance in order to take advantage of a lower cost. This
is also validated by improvement in the performance of the Substitution Effect Model over the
autoregressive and dynamics models with increases in the duration of the forecasting. Furthermore, the
substitution and dynamics model performs identically to the Substitution Effect Model; we do not find
any additional improvement over the SEM model by including the dynamics features.
We present the forecasting of the IT investment models for spot instance usage for a one week
duration in Table 8 for the US-West region. We can clearly observe that our proposed Substitution Effect
Model performs better than the existing autoregressive model and dynamics model.
Table 7. Forecasting of IT investment for one week
US west region
Models

(90 pc)

SD

Median

Average

RMSE
(25 pc)

(90 pc)

SD

0

0.68

0.67

0.61

4.91

0.05

12.41

12.42

0.24

0

0.32

1.93

0.32

3.48

0.02

7.49

12.04

0.03

0.23

0

0.68

0.67

0.61

4.91

0.05

12.41

12.42

0.02

0.24

0

0.32

1.93

0.32

3.48

0.02

7.49

12.04

Median

Average

0.03

0.23

Substitution
Effect Model

0.02

Dynamics
Model

Autoregressive
model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

MAPE
(25 pc)

The autoregressive and dynamics models perform similarly with the mean absolute percent accuracy of 3
percent. The Substitution Effect Model reduces the median value of mean absolute percent error across
instances by 33 percent compared to the autoregressive model. Moreover, the Substitution Effect Model
reduces the median value of the root mean square error over instances by 47.54 percent compared to the
autoregressive model. The performance of the dynamics model is similar to that of the autoregressive
model, which shows that the dynamics features do not improve the performance of the autoregressive
model. Similarly, we also do not find any improvement by using the Substitution Effect and Dynamics
Model over using the Substitution Effect Model. This shows that the dynamics features do not improve
the performance forecasting models for IT investment predictions under spot instance usage. Moreover,
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the performance of the Substitution Effect Model increases with increase in the forecasting duration
compared to the autoregressive model for one-week forecasting.
In Table 9, we compare the performances, based on the mean absolute percent error and root mean
square error for the US-West region for biweekly prediction duration, of four IT investment forecasting
models under spot instance usage: our proposed Substitution Effect Model and Substitution Effect and
Dynamics Model, the autoregressive model, and the dynamics model.
Table 8. Forecasting of IT investment biweekly
US west region
Models
Autoregressive
model
Substitution
Effect Model

(90 pc)

SD

Median

Average

RMSE
(25 pc)

(90 pc)

SD

0

0.83

0.83

1.61

14.87

0.13

33.38

44.85

0.15

0

0.23

0.78

0.67

6.24

0.03

12.9

20.83

0.03

0.3

0

0.83

0.83

1.61

14.87

0.13

33.38

44.85

0.01

0.15

0

0.23

0.78

0.67

6.24

0.03

12.9

20.83

Median

Average

0.03

0.3

0.01

MAPE
(25 pc)

Dynamics Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

We can clearly observe from the table that the Substitution Effect Model reduces the mean absolute
percent error averaged over all instances by 50 percent compared to the autoregressive model. The
Substitution Effect Model reduces the root mean square error averaged over instances by 58.03 percent,
compared to the autoregressive model. However, we do not find any improvement from using the
dynamics model over using the autoregressive model. This indicates that the dynamics features do not
improve the predictive performance of the model over the autoregressive features for IT investment
forecasting under spot instance usage. Furthermore, the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model does not
improve performance over the Substitution Effect Model for biweekly forecasting of IT investment. This
indicates that the dynamics features do not improve the predictive performance over the substitution effect
for predicting IT investment under spot instance usage.
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Table 9. Forecasting of IT investment for a month
US west region
Model
Median Average
Autoregressive
model
Substitution Effect
Model

MAPE
(25 pc)

(90 pc)

SD

Median Average

RMSE
(25 pc)

(90 pc)

SD

0.04

0.32

0

0.85

0.96

3.87

35.18

0.32

90.5

92.18

0.02

0.18

0

0.44

0.76

1.56

17.39

0.1

41.42

45.66

0.04

0.32

0

0.85

0.96

3.87

35.18

0.32

90.5

92.18

0.02

0.18

0

0.44

0.76

1.56

17.39

0.1

41.42

45.66

Dynamics Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics Model

In Table 10, we present the comparison of performances of our proposed models, the Substitution
Effect Model (SEM) and Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model (SEDM), with the existing
autoregressive model and dynamics model, for one-month-ahead IT in- vestment forecasting. We can
observe from Table 10 that the Substitution Effect Model reduces by 43.75 percent the mean absolute
percent error averaged over all instances, com- pared to the autoregressive model. The dynamics model
performs similarly to the autoregressive model. This suggests that the dynamics features do not improve
the performance of the forecasting model over the autoregressive features. The Substitution Effect Model
reduces by 50.56 percent the root mean square error averaged over instances, compared to the
autoregressive model. We do not find any forecasting performance improvement in using the Substitution
Effect and Dynamics Model over using the Substitution Effect Model. This suggests that the price
dynamics features do not improve forecasting accuracy over the substitution effect features in the case of
predicting IT investment under spot instance usage. We have also compared our results over the median,
25th percentile and 90th percentile to check the robustness of our results and found consistent results.
Figure 6 presents the jitter plot of the mean absolute percent error and root mean square error of
the proposed model and compares them with the existing models. We can observe from the figure that,
compared to the performances of the autoregressive model and dynamics model, the performance of the
Substitution Effect Model improves with the increase in the forecasting duration from one-day-ahead to
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one-month-ahead. We have also evaluated our models for the remaining durations.

Note: (1) Autoregressive Model (2) Dynamics Model (3) Substitution Effect Model and (4) Substitution and Dynamics Model

Figure 6. MAPE of comparison of forecasting models for different durations of forecast
Sensitivity with coefficient of variation (CV)
We also performed the sensitivity analysis to determine how the performance of our pro- posed models
varies with the changes in the volatility of the spot prices. This analysis is important for multiple reasons.
First, customers prefer less volatile instances to reduce the likelihood of being outbid if their bid is only
marginally higher than the market price .16 Second, the reduction in the price volatility improves the
forecasting of the IT investment forecasting models. We performed the sensitivity analysis for spot
instances within the US-West region.
The impact of price volatility on one-day, one-week, biweekly, and one-month-ahead IT
investment predictions is shown in Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 respectively for the US- West region. To
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categorize the spot instances in high and low volatility, we performed the median split, i.e., we computed
the coefficient of the variation of prices of each of the spot instances and took the median value, 0.329, to
split the spot instances in two categories (MacCallum et al. 2002). We categorized as high volatility spot
instances those whose coefficients of variation of price are higher than the median value, and we
categorized the rest as low volatility spot instances.
We can clearly observe that the proposed Substitution Effect Model outperforms the
autoregressive model in predicting the IT investment for both the high price volatility and the low price
volatility instances. However, we do not find any additional benefit in including the price dynamics
features in the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model. Furthermore, the Substitution Effect Model and
Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model perform better than the dynamics model and the autoregressive
model in IT investment forecasting under spot instance usage.
In Table 11, we present the price volatility analysis for high volatile and low volatile instances for
one-day-ahead forecasting of the IT investment under spot instance usage.
Table 10. Price volatility analysis for one day prediction
High CV
MAPE

Model

Low CV
RMSE

MAPE

RMSE

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

0.14

0.23

0.3

0.52

1.91

0.96

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.14

0.04

Substitution
Effect
Model

0.22

0.47

0.56

0.51

0.97

1.44

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.09

0.05

Dynami
cs
Model

0.14

0.23

0.3

0.52

1.91

0.96

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.03

0.14

0.04

0.22

0.47

0.56

0.51

0.97

1.44

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.09

0.05

Autoregressive
Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

Our proposed Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model works similarly to the autoregressive model for
low price volatility instances. The average mean absolute percent error for instances with low price
volatility is 1 percent and the average root mean square error for a one-day-ahead prediction is 0.03 USD.
However, our proposed model underperforms for high volatility instances for one-day-ahead forecasting.
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The performance of our Substitution Effect Model improves with increases in forecast duration such as
biweekly and monthly, for both high volatility and low volatility spot instances, as shown in the Tables
13 and 14, compared to the autoregressive and dynamics models. The dynamics model performs similarly
to the autoregressive model. This demonstrates that the price dynamics features do not improve the
performance of the IT investment forecasting models compared to the autoregressive models.
Furthermore, the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model performs similarly to the Substitution Effect
Model for both low and high volatility spot instances. This shows that the price dynamics features do not
improve the performance of the IT investment forecasting model compared to the Substitution Effect
Model. In Table 12, we examine the performance of our forecasting models over the low and high
volatility instances for the US-West region for the one-week-ahead IT investment forecasting duration.
As we can observe from Table 12, for low volatility instances, the average mean absolute percent error of
IT investment forecasting is 50 percent lower than with the autoregressive regression.
Table 11. Price volatility analysis for one week prediction
High CV
Model

MAPE

RMSE

Avg

SD

0.45

0.89

1

Substitution
Effect Model

0.47

2.71

Dynamics
Model

0.45

0.47

Autoregressive
Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

Low CV

(90 pc) Avg

MAPE

RMSE

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

9.12

16.14

21.7

0.02

0.09

0.03

0.68

3.52

1.11

0.78

6.61

16.4

13.1

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.33

1.14

0.67

0.89

1

9.12

16.14

21.7

0.02

0.09

0.03

0.68

3.52

1.11

2.71

0.78

6.61

16.4

13.1

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.33

1.14

0.67

For the Substitution Effect Model for low volatility instances, the mean absolute percent error is 1 percent.
Moreover, the root mean square error for the Substitution Effect Model is 51.47 percent lower than that
for the Substitution Effect Model. For high volatility instances, the substitution Effect Model performs
similarly to the autoregressive model. However, the performance of the Substitution Effect Model is better
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compared to the autoregressive model and the dynamics model, with an increase in duration of the IT
investment forecasting, as shown in Tables 13 and 14. The dynamics model performs similarly to the
autoregressive model for both high and low volatility instances. This demonstrates that the dynamics
features do not improve the accuracy of the predictive models for IT investment forecasting under spot
instance usage. Moreover, the performance of the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model is similar to
that of the Substituting Effect Model for both low and high volatility instances. This demonstrates that the
dynamics features do not improve the performance of the Substitution Effect Model.
Table 12. Price volatility analysis for biweekly prediction
High CV
MAPE

Model

Low CV
RMSE

MAPE

RMSE

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

0.57

1.11

1.34

27.62

59.31

60.61

0.02

0.13

0.04

Substitution
Effect Model

0.29

1.08

0.52

11.56

28.32

18.88

0.01

0.02

Dynamics
Model

0.57

1.11

1.34

27.62

59.31

60.61

0.02

0.29

1.08

0.52

11.56

28.32

18.88

0.01

Autoregressive
Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

(90 pc) Avg

SD

(90 pc)

2.05

13.38

2.25

0.02

0.9

3.08

1.21

0.13

0.04

2.05

13.38

2.25

0.02

0.02

0.9

3.08

1.21

In Table 13, we compare the predictions for low volatility and high volatility instances in our IT
investment forecasting models for a biweekly duration. As we can observe from the table, the mean
absolute percent error of the Substitution Effect Model for high volatility instances drops by 49.12 percent,
compared to that of the autoregressive model. Moreover, the root mean square error of the Substitution
Effect Model is 58.14 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model for high volatility instances.
The standard deviation of the mean absolute percent error for the Substitution Effect Model is 2.7 percent
lower than that of the autoregressive model for high volatility instances. The standard deviation of the root
mean square error for high volatility instances is 52.25 percent lower for the Substitution Effect Model
than for the autoregressive model. For low volatility instances, the mean absolute error of the Substitution
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Effect Model is 50 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model. The root mean square error for
the Substitution Effect Model is 56.09 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model. The
Substitution Effect Model has a lower standard deviation of the mean absolute percent error and root mean
square error compared to the autoregressive model. The standard deviation of the mean absolute percent
error for the Substitution Effect Model is 84.61 percent lower than that for the autoregressive models for
low volatility instances. The standard deviation of the root mean square error for the Substitution Effect
Model is 76.98 percent lower than that for the autoregressive regression for low volatility instances. The
dynamics model performs similarly to the autoregressive model for both low and high volatility instances.
This demonstrates that the dynamics features do not improve the performance of the IT investment
forecasting model compared to the autoregressive features. Moreover, the Substitution Effect and
Dynamics Model performs similarly to the Substitution Effect Model for both high and low volatility spot
instances. This shows that the dynamics features do not improve the forecasting accuracy above the
Substitution Effect Model.
Table 13. Price volatility analysis for monthly prediction
High CV
MAPE

Model

RMSE

MAPE

Low
CV

RMSE

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

Avg

SD

(90 pc)

0.62

1.28

1.38

64.5

117.49

141.28

0.02

0.07

0.05

5.71

38.3

7.33

Substitution
Effect Model

0.34

1.05

0.68

32.6

60.25

71.21

0.01

0.02

0.02

2.1

8.54

2.52

Dynamics
Model

0.62

1.28

1.38

64.5

117.49

141.28

0.02

0.07

0.05

5.71

38.3

7.33

0.34

1.05

0.68

32.6

60.25

71.21

0.01

0.02

0.02

2.1

8.54

2.52

Autoregressive
Model

Substitution
Effect and
Dynamics
Model

In Table 14, we compare the performance of the proposed IT investment forecasting models for both high
volatility and low volatility spot instances for the one-month-ahead forecasting duration. The Substitution
Effect Model outperforms the autoregressive model and the dynamics model based on the mean absolute
percent error and root mean squared error for both low and high volatility spot instances. As we can see
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from the table, for high volatility instances, the mean absolute percent error for the Substitution Effect
Model is 45.16 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model. The standard deviation of the mean
absolute percent error for the Substitution Effect Model is 17.97 percent lower than that for the
autoregressive model. The root mean square error for the Substitution Effect Model is 49.45 percent lower
than that for the autoregressive model for high volatility instances. For high volatility instances, the
standard deviation of the root mean square error for the Substitution Effect Model is 48.71 percent lower
than that for the autoregressive model. For low volatility instances, the mean absolute error for the
Substitution Effect Model is 50% lower than that for the autoregressive model. The standard deviation of
the mean absolute percent error for the Substitution Effect Model is 71.42 percent lower than that for the
autoregressive model. For low volatility instances, the root mean square error of the Substitution Effect
Model is 63.22 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model. The standard deviation of the root
mean square error for the Substitution Effect Model is 77.7 percent lower than that for the autoregressive
model. The dynamics model performs similarly to the autoregressive model for both low and high variance
instances. This demonstrates that the price dynamics features do not add to the performance of the
autoregressive model in forecasting the IT investment under spot instance usage. Moreover, we do not
find performance improvement of the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model over the Substitution
Effect Model for either low or high volatility instances. This shows that the price dynamics features do
not improve the performance of the forecasting model compared to the substitution effect features.
1.9 Discussion
In this chapter, we studied the managerial challenge of IT investment forecasting faced by businesses if
they adopt spot instances. First, we conceptualize an innovative way to mea- sure the substitution effect
across three dimensions – hardware types, operating systems, and location zones. Using econometric
analysis, we show that customers substitute spot in- stances across the aforementioned dimensions. We
use this substitution effect to build our IT forecasting model, the Substitution Effect Model (SEM).
Drawing from price dynamics literature, we build the dynamics model. We then extend our SEM model
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and include price dynamics features to build the Substitution Effect and Dynamics Model.
We compared the performance of Substitution Effect Model (SEM) with the traditional
autoregressive model and found that the SEM model outperforms the autoregressive model. The mean
absolute percent error of the SEM model for IT investment forecasting for a duration of one month is
43.75 percent lower than that for the autoregressive model. However, the dynamics model did not show
any improvement over the autoregressive model. Moreover, the SEDM model did not provide additional
improvement over the SEM model. This shows that the price dynamics do not improve the performance
of the IT investment forecasting model under spot instance usage. The performance of the SEM model is
better with low volatility instances than with high volatility instances.
Contribution to literature
Adopting the cloud spot market is an important strategy for organizations to reduce infrastructure costs,
as the cost saving can be, on average, more than 80 percent (Figure 1). While the majority of research in
spot market pricing has focused on the prediction of next-hour spot prices to help customers in their
bidding strategy, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first research which focuses on addressing
managerial challenges relating to forecasting IT investments under spot instance usage. We follow a
design science paradigm to build IT artifacts, to help organizations estimate their IT investments if they
adopt spot instances for provisioning of computing resources.
Recent research by Cheng et al. (2016), one of the first studies on spot instances in IS research,
finds that customers do not arbitrage instances across regions even when there is a significant price
difference. This absence of arbitrage has been explained by the differences in the Internet latency in these
regions. While Cheng et al. (2016) focus on spot instances across regions, we study spot instances in zones
within a region and find that customers substitute instances across three dimensions – operating systems,
hardware types, and locations (zones). We developed an innovative measure of substitution across these
dimensions and used econometric models (OLS and FGLS) to establish the substitution effect across the
dimensions. In doing so, we contribute to the literature in the study of price dynamics in the spot market.
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Our work also informs the auction price forecasting literature in two ways (Jank and Zhang 2011;
Bapna et al. 2008b; Wang et al. 2008). First, extant literature in auction pricing has studied the role of
price dynamics in forecasting the closing auction price in a single unit, one-time auction; ours is the first
work that focuses on price dynamics in multi-unit, continuous, simultaneous auctions. Second, while the
extant literature finds that the price dynamics play a key role in forecasting an online auction price, we
did not find any performance improvement from our model using dynamics features over the model using
the substitution effect. Moreover, the dynamics model performs similarly to the autoregressive model.
One plausible explanation for the lack of improvement may stem from the nature of internet auctions.
There are key differences in our study of cloud computing auctions and auctions on eBay, which have
been studied by Jank and Zhang (2011) and others (Choudhary and Shivendu 2017; Bapna et al. 2003a,
2001, 2000, 2003b, 2008a). First, auctions in eBay cover a limited period with a start and end time;
however, an auction in cloud computing is a continuous auction without any deadline. Second, items sold
in an eBay auction are final and the winner takes the item forever; however, in a cloud auction, the winner
may lose the item (a server, in this case) in the next moment if she is outbid by another customer. Third,
the eBay auction is an open auction in which the participants can observe the previous bid placed by other
participants. But a cloud auction is a closed bid auction and participants do not observe other participants’
bids. Fourth, the eBay auction is a second-price auction17, whereas in a cloud auction, the winner pays
the value of the last winning bid. Finally, there is only one winner in an eBay auction, whereas, in a cloud
auction, there may be multiple winners at any time. These characteristics result in a monotonically
increasing market price for an eBay auction which is favorable for models using price dynamics for
forecasting. However, the market price in the cloud auction is not a monotonic function and this could be
one of the plausible cause for the lower performance of the dynamics models and the price dynamics
features.
Much of the literature on spot instances has focused on predicting the spot price for a brief
duration such as a next-hour spot price (Singh and Dutta 2015). Such predictions can help customers
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choose their bid prices to obtain spot instances in real time. However, in a cloud computing resource
auction model such as spot instances, customers pay the market price or clearing price instead of their bid
price, similar to a vickrey auction (AWS 2017e; Krishna 2009). Therefore, as long as a customer bids a
value higher than the market price, he or she gets the resource and the usefulness of forecasting the next
hour’s price is limited (Singh and Dutta 2015). Even if a customer is able to reliably predict the next- hour
price of the spot instances, it does not help her in forecasting the IT investment or budget over long periods
of time. Therefore, in this chapter we develop models and algorithm that help organizations solve their IT
investment puzzles when they adopt spot instances; i.e., we focus on ex ante IT investment estimations
for organizations when they provision computing resources through spot instances.
Finally, recent research by Yang and Tate (2012) highlights that there is a paucity of research
dealing with business issues in Information Systems and cloud computing, including adoption, privacy,
legal issues, cost, trust, pricing and ethical issues. This chapter contributes towards three of the key
business issues: adoption, pricing, and cost.
Contribution to practice
Our research has immense practical implications for organizations seeking to reduce their IT infrastructure
cost. Customers can use the proposed IT investment forecasting model to predict their IT investment ex
ante while using spot instances. The model can also be used to search spot instances based on IT
investment and price volatility to determine the less volatile instances to achieve higher IT investment
forecasting accuracy. This not only enables customers to reduce costs using the spot instances but also
increases businesses’ agility by providing them with a pool of spot instances if needed during peak
business hours.
Much of the research in the past has focused on building fault-tolerant software (Javadi et al.
2011, 2013a,b) or developing algorithms for bidding strategies for cloud re- sources on the auction
platforms (Singh and Dutta 2015; Javadi et al. 2013b). However, little research addresses managerial
challenges in forecasting the IT investment requirements when the company uses spot instances. The
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dynamic nature of the costs in cloud computing auctions requires new, more appropriate algorithms and
models. The total cost of ownership (TCO) model18 allows organizations to compare IT investments for
on premise data centers and cloud migration based on pay-per-use fixed price models, but it does not
provide calculations for spot instances (Erl et al. 2013). The TCO cost calculation for pay-per-use models
of cloud computing is straightforward, since the price is fixed over time. However, it is difficult to estimate
the IT investment for spot instances because the prices are dynamic. Moreover, the extant research lacks
guidelines or forecasting models for organizations which have already migrated to the cloud but wish to
take advantage of potential savings through spot instances’ dynamic prices. In this chapter, following a
design science paradigm, we present an algorithm and forecasting models to solve organizational
challenges of forecasting reliable IT investment budgets when businesses adopt spot instances for
provisioning their computing resources.
Limitation
We have evaluated our proposed IT investment forecasting models in the US-West region only. However,
we expect that our results can be generalized to other data center locations since the policies of cloud data
centers in different regions of AWS remain the same. We have tested our proposed models for the USEast region and found consistent results as part of the robustness check. We intend to test our models for
the remaining regions across the globe, especially in Asia and Europe, where we observe rapid expansion
of cloud computing with the establishment of new data centers from multiple cloud providers.
With recent advancements in the auction platform for the spot market, AWS has updated the auction
mechanism so that customers can specify the expected duration of usage as well as bid amount, number
of instances, type of instances, operating system and location. Specifying the duration of usage reduces
the information uncertainty for the cloud vendor and also reduces difficulties for customers because adding
that information reduces the chance of sudden preemption of their instances when the spot price rises. Our
current IT investment models do not include the expected duration of usage as a predictor variable. We
intend to add the customer’s expected duration to our Substitution Effect Model and extend our IT
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investment forecasting models as part of our future research.
Future research
Since auction pricing models are a new phenomenon in cloud computing, there exist multiple
opportunities for future research work. First, cloud vendors provide different types of spot instances with
different configurations and hardware architectures with varying prices over time. It is very difficult for
the customers to select the optimal configuration of resources based on spot instance characteristics, job
completion deadline and price optimization. The future researchers can use application resource usage
data to solve this problem.
Second, we need to improve the ability of existing frameworks like MapReduce to accommodate
the more complicated fault-tolerances of spot instances. The major limitation of this framework in the
context of using spot instances is that it considers all instances equal on the basis of the designated fault
tolerance. However, in the case of spot instances, the customer’s bid for a spot instance determines its
fault tolerance. As the amount of customers’ bid increase, the fault tolerance of the instance also increases.
So, an improved MapReduce framework which takes into account volatility of spot instances is an
opportunity for future work in this domain.
Third, future research should investigate whether cloud providers selling unused capacity are
better off offering their customers a transparent but complex AWS style auction or a simple but inflexible
Google-style fixed price reduction. There is an ongoing debate about the mode of implementing price
discrimination for cloud computing resources19. On one hand, AWS provides unused capacity using the
auction platform; Google, on the other hand, provides instances with a fixed reduction compared to its
premium on-demand service. Neither platform offers guarantees against preemption. An auction-based
platform provides transparency in the process of allocating the resources (the market clearing price or spot
price is publicly available) and the customer can improve her chance of winning a spot instance by
increasing her bid amount; in contrast, the fixed price reduction model introduced by Google is a closed
system wherein customers can neither observe the decision process nor influence it in any way. However,
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AWS’s auction transparency is offset by the complexity of operational and managerial challenges in
dealing with its auction platform; there is no such complexity with fixed discounted price platform
provided by Google. It is not clear whether customers will favor autonomy and transparency of auctionbased model over the simplicity of a fixed discount model or vice-versa and we plan to compare these
models in our future research.
Relevance of IS Research
This study is relevant to multiple Information Systems research areas including digital infrastructure
research in cloud computing, big data and predictive analytics, and design science research.
Digital infrastructure research in IS: The digital infrastructure research in IS has received attention as
one of the key IT artifacts (Tilson et al. 2010). Cloud computing is one of the important forms of digital
infrastructure used in multiple industries. However, there is a paucity of research in Information Systems
investigating the complexities of the digital infrastructures (Tilson et al. 2010). This chapter contributes
to this immensely important core topic of Information Systems research. Recent studies in cloud
computing in Information Systems have examined four key topics: technological issues, business issues,
cloud computing conceptualization, and application. Among these, business issues in cloud computing
have received the least attention from the Information Systems community. In this chapter, we solve one
of the challenges of forecasting IT investments in auction- based pricing platforms and help organizations
to further reduce their IT operating costs. Specifically, our research lies on the intersection of three
important business issues – cost, pricing, and the adoption of cloud computing.
Big data and predictive analytics: Predictive analytics has received tremendous attention in Information
Systems research in recent years (Lin et al. 2017, Brynjolfsson et al. 2016; Breuker et al. 2016; Martens
et al. 2016; Bao and Datta 2014). The majority of the research in predictive analytics harnesses the volume
of big data which is nearly impossible to analyze manually and uses the insights in predictive analytics.
One of the key patterns in these studies is that the models used to capture the trends in the data are complex
systems. Similarly, in cloud computing auction-based pricing, there are hundreds of computing resources
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being auctioned in real-time. We model the price relationship among the instances to discover the
substitution effect wherein customers substitute resources during the auction to further reduce their costs.
We simultaneously model the substitution effect along with price dynamics and use this model to reliably
predict the IT investment for companies using auction-based cloud resources.
7.5.3.

Design science: We have followed a design science paradigm (Hevner et al. 2004; Gregor and

Hevner 2013) to conduct our study. In this study, we first discover the substitution effect wherein
customers substitute cloud resources during the auction to leverage a lower cost. We follow the design
science paradigm to build predictive models, one of the four IT artifacts described by Hevner et al. (2004).
Prior research has built predictive models (Bao and Datta 2014; Lin et al. 2017) to solve complex business
problems. Bao and Datta (2014) developed a topic modeling-based predictive model to quantify risk in
financial documents. Lin et al. (2017) built a Bayesian multitask learning approach to predict the patient’s
risk of future adverse health events. Similarly, in this chapter, we build two predictive models to estimate
IT investment for organizations using auction-based cloud resources. We follow the design science
research contribution type outlined by Gregor and Hevner (2013) to highlight that we have developed a
Nascent design theory wherein we have defined a new construct, the substitution effect, to capture the
price inter-relationship among auction-based cloud resources. We further use it to build forecasting
models along with an algorithm for learning the model. We also provide an instantiation of the proposed
model and evaluate it using a real-world data set.
1.10 Conclusion
Auction-based pricing models in cloud computing, such as Amazon spot instances, are emerging business
models. In this chapter, we follow design science methodology to build and evaluate novel forecasting
models and an algorithm to estimate IT investment for organizations using spot instances to reduce their
IT infrastructure cost. We also posit that the prices of these instances are inter-related over three
dimensions: hardware types, locations, and operating systems of the instances. We term this price interrelationship the substitution effect and demonstrate that the prices of spot instances influence each other
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over the aforementioned dimensions.
By leveraging the substitution effect, we build the Substitution Effect Model (SEM) to forecast
the IT investment under spot instance usage. Drawing from the price dynamics literature, we extend the
SEM model by including price dynamics features and we present the Substitution Effect and Dynamics
Model (SEDM). The SEM model consistently out- performs the autoregressive models and the dynamics
model presented in the literature. However, contrary to findings in the literature and our initial intuition,
the SEDM does not improve the accuracy of the forecasting model compared to the SEM model. We further evaluated the robustness of our proposed models with changing price volatility of spot instances. Our
results show that the proposed models perform far better with low price volatility than with high price
volatility.
Since auction pricing models are a new phenomenon in cloud computing, multiple opportunities
exist for future research work. First, cloud vendors provide different types of spot instances with different
configurations and hardware architectures with varying prices over time. Business find it difficult to
choose optimal configuration of hardware, operating system, and location at the lowest cost for specific
job completion deadline. Our future work will incorporate data from application usage to solve this
problem. Second, one of the important frameworks for distributed computing with in-built fault tolerance
is MapReduce. The major limitation of this framework in the context of using spot instances is that its
fault-tolerance levels consider all instances equal. However, in the case of spot instances, each customer’s
bid for a spot instance determines its fault tolerance. With an increase in customers’ bids for spot instances,
the framework increases the fault tolerance of the instance. So, an improved MapReduce framework which
can accommodate prices of spot instances in real-time, is one of the future projects in this domain.
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Chapter 2: Predicting Security Events in Cloud Computing
2.1 Abstract
Organizations migrate to the cloud computing environment to achieve cost reduction, business agility, and
elasticity. However, cloud migration brings another set of challenges such as data security & privacy,
resource management, and compliance. Recently, cloud vendors have started offering services to their
customers to collect detailed logs of events and resource utilization. However, the cloud computing
ecosystem lacks frameworks, models, and IT artifacts to analyze such logs to draw business insights and
address the above challenges. Following Design science research paradigm, we present a Gaussian
Bayesian Network based approach for learning the underlying dependencies among the events in cloud
services to determine the antecedents and consequences of security related events. Moreover, using our
model, we predict the security related events with average mean error of 0.13 events for one day ahead
forecast. We further discuss our research implications for software development, security, and IT audit in
cloud computing environment.
2.2 Keywords
Cloud computing, security, Gaussian Bayesian Network, AWS
2.3 Introduction
Cloud computing is new model for IT provisioning for organizations (Labes et al. 2017; Riedl et al. 2010).
It reduces fixed IT cost, increases organizational flexibility, and decreases time to market new products and
solutions (Müller et al. 2015). Extant research in Information System has focused on studying various topics
in cloud computing including pricing, such as pay-per use model and spot market (Cheng et al. 2016; Singh
and Dutta 2015), adoption (Bhattacherjee & Park 2014), etc. However, there is paucity of research
addressing the security challenges in cloud computing.
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There has been numerous cloud security data breaches reported in the mainstream news media
recently (Larson 2017; O’Sullivan 2017a). In one of the events, the data of over 198 million voters were
left exposed by a firm working on behalf of Republican National Committee (RNC) due to improper cloud
security deployment (O’Sullivan 2017c). In another event, personal data of around 6 million customers
were leaked from a telecommunication company due to inappropriate cloud storage security settings. As
per Upguard.com, a leading cloud security provider, one of the world’s largest corporate consulting and
management firm left its cloud storage unsecured and publicly downloadable, containing sensitive business
information (O’Sullivan 2017b). One of the emerging patterns in these cloud security risks is that these are
result of human error involving inappropriate cloud security deployment. Moreover, the intensity and
frequency of these risks are expected to grow with increasing cloud adoption and growing complexity of
cloud services.
The organizations use numerous cloud services to run their business. The leading cloud vendors
such as Amazon AWS provide around forty different services. Organizations combine these different
services to build their application. These services are consumed using Application Programming Interfaces
or APIs and each API use is an event or an independent unit of action. With growing number of services
and underlying complexity, organization face challenges to assess and monitor the security of their
applications. To assist customers in this regard, cloud providers have recently introduced another group of
services which monitor and log the events or API calls made by organizations in different services. These
logs are valuable for security and compliance research in cloud computing. The three important challenges
for organizations securing their applications in cloud environment are (1) discover and quantify security
threats (2) identify potential sources (associational or causal) of those security threats, (3) predicting
security threats so that corrective measures may be applied to mitigate or reduce them prior to their
occurrence. We follow Design science methodology (Gregor & Hevner 2013; Hevner et al. 2004) to present
an IT artifact which applies Gaussian Bayesian Network to learn probabilistic dependency structure among
the cloud events from log files. Our key focus is to determine the association between the events related to
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security threats to other events. This approach provides two advantages (a) determine a smaller set of event
types related to security threat events so that organizations can further narrow their focus on these events
to find the probable cause. (b) This technique also helps in feature selection to select events which are
associated with security threat events.
Our approach of modelling security-related events in a cloud environment follows a black-box
approach with respect to applications which are generating these events. Our approach does not require
information related to applications deployed over the cloud infrastructure. This is a pragmatic approach
because it is challenging in the cloud environment to exactly determine the relationship among the cloud
events and applications generating these events. Moreover, multiple applications within an organization
may share the cloud resources and services and it is challenging to associate events to corresponding
applications.
We use a Gaussian Bayesian Network to determine the relationship among the events without
application knowledge (Geiger & Heckerman 1994). Gaussian Bayesian Network is a probabilistic
graphical model (PGM) which learns and identifies the relationships (probabilistic dependence) among
cloud events in the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (D. Koller and N. Friedman 2009). It is an
emerging technique which is different from traditional Bayesian Network over categorical variables (Pearl,
1988). In Gaussian Bayesian Network, we assume that the variables are normally distributed and the
probabilistic dependence relationships among the variables are represented using a linear model involving
means of the independent and dependent events. We use hill-climbing algorithm (Scutari 2009) to learn
the Gaussian Bayesian Network from the data.
We use one year of longitudinal data from a multinational organization using Amazon AWS
platform. The data is in form of JSON files from AWS CloudTrail service. The organization is some
analytics firm which consumes variety of different cloud services from AWS to support its different
applications.
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Our results demonstrate that the antecedents of security related events can be probabilistically
identified with our approach. Moreover, with the knowledge of dependency network, organizations can
build IT controls to review the actions of their employees which lead to security related events. Furthermore,
using our prediction model build on features selected from Gaussian Bayesian Network, we predict the
security related events one day in advance. The average (over 15 days) mean error for one day ahead
prediction is 0.13 events. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our related
work followed by our approach in section 3. In section 4, we present our results. We present discussion and
implications of our study in section 5, followed by conclusion in section 6.
2.3 Related Work
Bayesian Networks are graphical models which abstract and model the real-world using a directed acyclic
graph (DAG), wherein the direction of the relationships or links among the nodes of the graph represents
conditional dependence (Margaritis 2003; Pearl 1988). One of the key advantages of Bayesian Network
over other graphical models such as Markov models (D. Koller and N. Friedman, 2009) is that unlike
Markov models which lack directionality in their graphical structure, Bayesian Networks are directional.
Bayesian Networks have been used in multiple domains in extant literature such as Healthcare (Weng-Keen
Wong Andrew Moore 2003), databases (Dey & Sarkar 2000), banking (Sarkar & Sriram 2001), marketing
(Cui et al. 2006), financial networks (Gandy & Veraart 2016) and structural modelling (Zheng & Pavlou
2010). Please see (Buntine 1996) for recent literature on learning probabilistic networks from data.
Bayesian Networks have been used in predictive modelling as well (Kita et al. 2012). Kita et al.
(2012) used the Bayesian Network for stock price prediction. They compared their approach with the
existing time series models such as autoregressive model (AR), moving average model (MV),
autoregressive and moving average model (ARIMA), and autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic
model. The Bayesian Network based approach proposed by Kita et al. (2012) outperformed the traditional
time series models mentioned above.
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In the cloud computing research in Information Systems, some of the recent literature has
investigated the factors which inhibit cloud adoption (August et al. 2014; Chen & Wu 2013; Cheng et al.
2016). However, very few studies have focused on the security issues in cloud environment (August et al.
2014). August et al. (2014) focused on the difference in impact of security risk in on-premises software and
SaaS offering. The authors suggest that the impact of security risk is higher in the case of cloud offerings
compared to on-premises offering because, in the former, the attackers can impact multiple organizations
at once. Yang & Tate (2012) provides a comprehensive literature review of cloud computing business
research highlighting the paucity of research in cloud security. Our research contributes towards filling the
above literature gap. For comprehensive literature review of cloud computing, please see Weinhardt et al.
(2009) and Müller et al. (2015).
2.4 Research Context
One of the factors inhibiting cloud security research is lack of the empirical data. Recently, public cloud
providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) have started providing logging services to their customers
so that they can track their activities and resource utilization within the cloud environment (Amazon Web
Services 2015; AWS 2017). Organizations may consume several cloud services and the activities within
those services are tracked using logging services. Moreover, AWS delivers these logs in semi-structured
NoSQL (JSON) file data format to the organizations. This logging service in AWS is called CloudTrail
(AWS, 2017) and a similar service provided by Microsoft Azure called Log Analytics (Microsoft 2017).
The logs consist of details of events generated by consumption of various cloud services.
Organization using cloud computing from AWS may request for CloudTrail logging services. The
organizations must provide the location for storing the log files which in case of AWS is S3 storage service.
Once the organization has provided the storage folder name on the S3 service and enabled the CloudTrail
service, the data of cloud events are collected in real-time in the S3 folders. Organizations may either take
the archive of past data for analysis or may also build solutions to consume this data in real-time. In this
chapter, we use CloudTrail data to learn the probabilistic dependence among the cloud events especially
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security related events and further use it to predict these events. We use Gaussian Bayesian Network model
for this purpose.
2.5 Approach
Bayesian Networks have been applied in the past to study various scenarios wherein the variables are
categorical (Pearl 1988). In this chapter, we model the relationship among the cloud service events which
are continuous variables using Gaussian Bayesian Network. Unlike categorical variables, the key challenge
working with continuous variables in Bayesian Network is that it is difficult to conceptualize conditional
probability distribution. The conditional probability distribution between a node and its antecedents
represents the strength of probabilistic dependency (Pearl, 1988). To address this limitation of Bayesian
Network with continuous variables, we assume the distribution of the variables as multivariate normal
(Gaussian) and use Gaussian Bayesian Networks to learn the relationship among the events or variables.
Figure 1 presents an example Gaussian Bayesian Network for three cloud events A, B, and C.
In Figure 1, E represents an event set, which is set of cloud events. We formally represent, E = {A,
B, C}. The event A conditionally depends on the events B and C as shown in Figure 7. This dependence is
formally represented as {B, C}  A. The independent events such as B and C are represented as a normal
distribution using their means and standard deviations. As shown in Figure 1, the event B has mean 𝜇𝐵 and
standard deviation 𝜎𝐵 . Similarly, event C is represented by mean 𝜇𝑐 and standard deviation 𝜎𝑐 . The event
A conditionally depend on events B and C such that the mean of the event A is a linear function of means
of events B and C, and the distribution of A is represented as ~ 𝑁 (𝑤𝐵 𝜇𝐵 + 𝑤𝑐 𝜇𝐶 + 𝛼, 𝜎𝐴2 ) where 𝑤𝐵
and 𝑤𝑐 are weights and α is a constant. 𝜎𝐴 represents standard deviation of event A. Here, we assume that
the standard deviation of event A does not depend on the events B and C.
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B ~ N (µB , σB2)

Event (B)

Event (C)

C ~ N (µC , σC2)

Event (A)

A| B, C ~ N (wBµB +wCµC + α , σA2)

Figure 7. Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) for Gaussian Bayesian Network of cloud events
There are two ways to learn the structure of a Bayesian Network. First, the structure of the Bayesian
Network is specified using domain knowledge or by the expert (Pearl 1988). However, in case of cloud
environment, it is challenging to map the application level knowledge of resource usage to the cloud
infrastructure events recorded in the log files (Dutta and VanderMeer 2014). Second, the data driven
approach to learn the Gaussian Bayesian Network is dynamic and can be retrained to adapt with changing
application development environment in organizations.
We learn the Gaussian Bayesian Network from the data using Hill climbing algorithm (Nagarajan
et al. 2013). Hill climbing algorithm is a score-based structure learning algorithm for Bayesian learning.
The score-based learning finds a Gaussian Bayesian network that optimizes (maximizes) the overall score
of the network. The score is a measure of how well the Gaussian Bayesian Network describes the data
(Margaritis 2003). We define the score for a Gaussian Bayesian Network in Equation (1). Here, ‘E’
represents the Gaussian Bayesian Network of cloud events which can be represented as the posterior
distribution of cloud events E given data.
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑬, 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) = 𝑃 (𝑬|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) … .. (1)
Following the Bayes’ rule, we can write the posterior probability distribution in terms of the likelihood
function and prior distribution as presented in Equation (2).
𝑃(𝑬|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) =

𝑃 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 |𝑬) × 𝑃(𝑬)
… … . (2)
𝑃 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎)
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To maximize the score shown in Equation (2), we vary the structure E, treating P (Data) which is
independent of structure E, as a constant in the score maximization process. Hence, the score is proportional
to 𝑃(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 |𝑬) × 𝑃(𝑬). We assume prior probability of events P(E) as an uninformed prior (Heckerman,
1995). With large sample size, the past research has shown that the

𝑃(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 |𝑬) × 𝑃(𝑬) can be

approximated to multivariate Gaussian (Kass et al. 2015). Therefore, the score for event structure E given
‘Data’ can be represented as BICscore which is adapted from the literature (Margaritis 2003; Schwarz 1978)
as shown in Equation (3). Here, 𝑝̂ represents the set of maximum likelihood estimates and ‘d’ represents
the number of parameters in the multivariate gaussian distribution.
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑬, 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) = 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑬, 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎) = log(Pr(𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|𝑝̂ , 𝑬) −

𝑑
log 𝑁 … … (3)
2

The hill-climbing search maximizes the BICscore to determine the Gaussian Bayesian Network with the
best fit for a given data. One of the key features of the using BICscore is that it does not depend on the prior
distribution of structure, i.e., the score does not require the prior information of cloud events P(E).
2.6 Data
We use a unique data set of CloudTrail logs from a medium size multinational analytics firm which uses
AWS services extensively. The data is collected over a period of approximately one year from January 1,
2015, to December 15, 2015. AWS offers CloudTrail service to record customers’ API calls and delivers
the log files to a cloud-based storage (Amazon Web Services 2015; AWS 2017). These files are stored in
a hierarchical structure using a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) file format. CloudTrail records provide
details of the identity of the individual/employee using the service, name of API call and its service,
request parameters, service response along with timestamp. The data set contains 344,460 events stored in
31,062 files.
There are various types of events generated from different cloud services. We categorized these
events in two groups (1) descriptive events (2) action events. Descriptive events are generated from API
calls which queries the state of a cloud service. For example, an individual may use an API call to
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determine the network policy used in their cloud services. On the other hand, action events alter and
modify the state of the system. For example, an individual uses an API call to start a new virtual machine
in cloud environment is an action event.
Table 14. Description of variables (events) used in modelling.
Event name
Reboot
instance
Request spot
instance
Terminate
instance
Run instance
Create
snapshot
Run job flow

Purge queue
Error
(Security
event)
Delete
snapshot
Create
network
interface
Authorize
security group
ingress
Delete
network
interface
Create Tags
Add job flow
steps

Cloud service
Amazon EC2
Amazon EC2
Amazon EC2
Amazon EC2
Amazon EC2
Amazon
Elastic
MapReduce
Simple queue
service(SQS)
Multiple
services

Amazon EC2
Amazon EC2

Amazon EC2

Amazon EC2

Details
It is used to reboot an instance or machine in the cloud
environment.
It is used to request a group of spot instances which are auctionbased computer resources.
It is used to terminate any instance in the Amazon EC2 service.
It is used to launch a specific number of instances.
It creates a snapshot of an EBS volume and stores it in Amazon
S3.
It creates and starts a new job cluster or job flow in elastic
MapReduce.
This API deletes messages from a queue and finally delete the
queue as well.
We aggregated the number of errors from different services for
every day. These errors have different types including access
denied, validation exception, and unauthorized operation. We
aggregated the errors daily level.
It deletes a specific snapshot. Snapshots are the backup images of
virtual machine or instances.
This API call creates a network interface with a specified subnet
for a compute instance.
The API call adds one or more rules to a security group. A
security group is defined as a logical boundary wherein customer
implement security controls and policies.
The API call deletes a network interface from a virtual machine.

Amazon EC2 It adds or overwrites one or more tags for Amazon resources.
Amazon
It adds new instances to an existing map-reduce cluster.
Elastic
MapReduce
We selected the events which represent customers’ actions in the cloud environment shown in

Table 14. The action events attempt to change the state of any system or service. For example, ‘Reboot
instance’ is an action event which reboots any virtual machine. We excluded events which are used to
determine the status of the system without performing any action from our analysis because these events
62

are not likely antecedents of security events. Moreover, we represent the security events as Errors as shown
in Table 1. The security related events include access denied, validation exception, and unauthorized
operations. Table 1 presents the list of action events included in this research.
There are 110 unique events captured in the logs. We observe 8115 events for different error codes
consisting of 27 unique error codes. The error code represents a specific form of error which includes
security related errors as well. We identified two security related errors – (1) access denied, and (2)
unauthorized operation. The access denied events constitute 28 % of total security events. Moreover,
unauthorized operation accounts for 9% of total security events. In this chapter, we focus on access denied
and unauthorized access accounts which together constitutes ~37% of the security related events in
CloudTrail.
2.7 Results
Gaussian Bayesian Network Modelling
We model the events shown in Table 1 using Gaussian Bayesian Network and present the complete
probabilistic dependency network in Figure 2. The model fit of the dependency network is presented in
Table 3. There are 28 edges in the network with average Markov blanket of size 5.07. The Markov blanket
determines the direct dependence of a node in Bayesian Network which includes its parents, children, and
parent of children (Aliferis et al. 2003). The structural dependency of errors (security events) is shown in
Figure 2. The error depends on four action events - ‘Console login’, ‘Create tags’, ‘Reboot instance’, and
‘Terminate instance’ events. The distribution of the security error event can be represented as a normal
distribution ~ N (5.878 + 6.294 * Create tags + 8.394 * Console login + 1.25 * Reboot instance – 10.172 *
Terminate instance, 47.9022). The two of four action events which are responsible for security events –
Reboot instance and Terminate instance are important from domain knowledge perspective because both
these events make resources unavailable and therefore users received access denied error. Moreover, other
two action events, failed attempts to console login and tags creation may lead to authorization related
security error.
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Prediction of security events using Gaussian Bayesian Network
We use Gaussian Bayesian Network to select the events which are associated with security related events
and further use to predict the security events or errors using the probabilistic dependence relationship
learned from the data in described the previous section. The predictive model for our security related error
is shown in Equation (4) below. 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡+1 represents the number of security events or error events observed
on the day (t+1). 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 , 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑠𝑡 , 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 , and 𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
represents the number of events which impact security related error. Unlike approaches discussed in
literature (Aliferis et al., 2003) which use Markov blanket for the feature selection, we include only parents
of security events and did not include its children and children’s parents due to time precedence of parent
events before children event.
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑤0 + 𝑤1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝑤2 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑠𝑡 + 𝑤3 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 +
𝑤4 𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 … … . . (4)
We can observe from the Equation (4) that for Gaussian Bayesian Network based prediction, we
do not need to include all variables. Therefore, this technique not only provides probabilistic relationship
among events but also used as a variable selection/reduction technique. Using the Gaussian Bayesian fitting,
we learned the estimates of the weights. We evaluated our prediction with one day ahead forecasting. We
split the dataset into training and test set in 80:20 ratio. The training set consists of 280 samples and test
set consists of 70 samples. We build our model with [1, (280 + t)] samples and test the security error
prediction for (280+t+1) samples.
Table 15. Prediction of security error using Gaussian Bayesian network
Duration 
15 days average
30 days average
45 days average
Average (ME)
0.13
3.76
4.62
Average (RMSE)
12.57
15.58
16.89
Average (MAE)
12.57
15.58
16.89
ME: Mean Error, RMSE: Root Mean Square Error, MAE: Mean Absolute Error
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Figure 8. (Color Online) Trained Gaussian Bayesian network

Table 16. Summary result of Gaussian Bayesian network
Number of nodes
Number of arcs
Number of undirected arcs
Number of directed arcs
Average Markov blanket size
Average neighborhood size

15
28
0
28
5.07
3.73

Score
Penalization coefficient
Tests used in the learning procedure
Optimization
Average branching factor
Learning algorithm
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BIC (Gaussian)
2.94
497
True
1.87
Hill climbing

The results show that the model can reliably predict the number of security related error events for next
day with 0.13 mean error averaged over 15 days. With the increase in the number of days of prediction,
we observe a reduction in the accuracy.
2.8 Discussion
The security of applications in a cloud environment is of utmost importance today. The cloud security and
data privacy are two of the key factors that inhibit of cloud migration. In this chapter, we present a Gaussian
Bayesian Network approach to model the events in the cloud environment and present the probabilistic
dependency among the cloud events. This dependency graph represents the antecedents and consequence
of cloud events.
We use this graphical network to determine probabilistic dependence of security related errors, and
further use the conditional relationship among the events to forecast security related error events for one
day ahead prediction.

The proposed approach has multiple practical implications for the software

developers, security analysts and information systems auditors. The application development in the cloud
environment involves utilizing various services offered by the cloud providers. The reliability of these
services is guaranteed by the service level agreement (SLA) of the cloud provider. However, the cloud users
face challenges to resolve the issues related to their applications. An error in an application may originate
from any of the cloud services. Our Gaussian Bayesian Network can help developers to determine
antecedents of the errors and assists them in defect discovery and fixing process.
Security analysts in the cloud computing environment must proactively determine the antecedents
of security related errors (Jaatun et al. 2012). Moreover, they also need to predict security threats in advance
so that the management could take appropriate measures to avoid them. Such mechanisms are termed as
preventive security measures. Our Gaussian Bayesian Network approach to security error analysis in cloud
environment not only provides antecedents and consequences of security events but also reliably predicts
them in future and supports preventive security measures.
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Information systems auditors in organizations have difficulties in assessing the security of the IT
infrastructure in the cloud environment (Wang et al. 2010). The auditors are dependent on the data log files
provided by cloud providers to assess the security risk in an organization (Amazon Web Services 2015).
However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first research which provides a Gaussian Bayesian
Network based framework which IT auditors may use to audit cloud security and compliance in an
organization.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on probabilistic graphical model (Koller 2009).
There has been increasing adoption of Bayesian Network and Bayesian statistics in the Information systems
research (Dey et al. 2000; Sarkar et al. 2001; Zheng et al. 2010). This chapter contributes to the Bayesian
Network literature by demonstrating its application in determining antecedents and consequences of
security related threats and its prediction in an emerging field of cloud computing.
2.9 Conclusion
The cloud computing infrastructure logs provide rich information regarding IT operations, security, and
auditing. However, there is lack of framework, models, and IT artifacts to analyze such information and
derive business insights. In this chapter, we present a Gaussian Bayesian Network to model the
interdependencies among the cloud events. We conduct an exploratory study to examine the antecedents
and consequences of security related events in applications using cloud services. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first research which attempts to model the service interdependency in such
environment. Furthermore, we predict the number of security related events in one-day advance with mean
error of 0.13 events. One of the key limitations of our approach is that the computing resources required to
build Bayesian network increases rapidly with increase in the number events. One of the solutions to this
limitation is to prune the set events and only select critical events before building Gaussian Bayesian
Networks. Moreover, the solution presented in this chapter is generalizable across organizations and
industries due to standardization of cloud services data format. We plan to build a SaaS application to
generate actionable insights from these logs without requiring organizations to share data with third party
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companies as part of our future research. Moreover, we also plan to robustly test our proposed model for
different categories of malicious and non-malicious events.
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Chapter 3: Proactive threat prediction using LSTM in cloud computing
3.1 Introduction
Cloud computing market is growing exponentially and is estimated to reach $159.28 Billion by the year
2020. There are multiple public cloud providers including Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure,
and Google cloud platform today. As of year 2018, AWS leads the cloud market with 33% of the global
share. Among various services offered by cloud providers, the group of services providing security in cloud
environment has surpassed other groups such as computing, data storage, etc. This demonstrates the
growing demand for building security services in cloud environment for protecting other important services
offered to the customers.
Cloud computing provides up-front cost reduction, business agility, and ease of procurement of resources
to organizations. Security and privacy are two of the key challenges inhibiting the adoption of cloud
computing (NIST, 2017; Al-Badi et at. 2018; Yang and Tate 2012). There has been numerous attacks to
cloud applications resulting in data leaks reported in news media (Larson, 2017). For example, in one of
the recent events, Verizon confirmed data leak of around 6 million users containing sensitive information
from their application running in cloud environment (Larson, 2017). To protect organizations against such
threats, public cloud vendors provide tools to organizations to secure their cloud environment (Khorshed,
Ali, & Wasimi, 2012). The onus to cloud security is shared between cloud provider and organization using
their services. This model of cloud security is called “Shared Security Model”.
Data-driven proactive security approaches to protect applications in cloud environment are being
explored, both in academia (Khorshed et al. 2012) and in industry (Kirti et al., 2015). The detection and
prediction of security events is an important challenge. Recent research has highlighted demand for building
proactive threat detection models to address the above challenge (Khorshed et al. 2012; Taghavi et al. 2012).
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In this chapter, we address this literature gap by building deep learning based model for security threat
prediction in cloud environment.
One of the important and growing security threats is unauthorized access to assets within
organization (Netwrix cloud security survey 2016). The ability of an organization to identify, authenticate,
authorize, and monitor the individuals who are accessing assets of an organization is important to protecting
an Information System (IS) from threats and vulnerabilities (Zissis and Lekkas 2010). Since the access to
assets in an organization are both from inside and outside of organization, the unauthorized access may also
result from agents within and outside of an organization. In this chapter, we focus on the unauthorized
access from the agents within an organization.
The detection and prediction of unauthorized access is an emerging challenge in cloud environment
(Kirti et al. 2015; Alampalayam 2004). However, there is paucity of research addressing detection and
prediction of unauthorized access events in cloud computing environment. Therefore, we address following
objective in this chapter.
Objective 1: How can we detect and predict future unauthorized access events in cloud computing
environment?
Deep learning is an emerging technique in machine learning literature which allows computational models
composed of multiple layers for building predictive models (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016). It
has revolutionized various fields including speech recognition, visual object recognition, object detection,
drug discovery, and genomics (LeCun et al. 2016). Deep learning presents multiple groups of algorithms.
Two of the important groups of algorithms are convolutional neural network (Lecun & Bengio, 1995) for
spatial problems such as images, and recurrent neural networks (Rumelhart 1986; Goodfellow et al. 2016)
for modeling temporal problems involving sequential data. We build our solution using recurrent neural
network and its enhancements in this chapter to address the following objective.
Objective 2: Does deep learning based sequence models perform better compared to traditional
time series models in predicting future security events in cloud computing?
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We collected data from a medium size multinational data analytics firm which uses Amazon Web Services
(AWS)1 cloud platform for its operations. The data was collected over a period of one year (2015) using a
logging service in AWS called CloudTrail (AWS 2007). CloudTrail service logs the event data from all
other AWS services used by an organization (Amazon Web Services 2015). These logs contain security
threat events such as unauthorized access. Unauthorized access event occurs when an individual or an
application attempts to access resources without authorization. We analyzed the CloudTrail log files and
aggregated the number of unauthorized access events taking place hourly. We further split the data into
80:20 ratio across time with initial 80 percent data representing training samples and remaining 20 percent
data as test sample.
We applied Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) model, an enhanced recurrent neural network, to
predict the number unauthorized access events for the test sample and evaluate the prediction accuracy
based on Root Mean Square Error (RMSE). The RMSE for our prediction model is 1.07 events. Our results
demonstrate that the LSTM model outperforms (18.5 percent reduction in RMSE) the time series models
for prediction such as Autoregressive (AR) model, Autoregressive and Moving Average (ARIMA) model,
and HoltWinters model. Moreover, we also examined the performance of LSTM model by varying the
number of hidden layers and number of neuron in each hidden layer. The results demonstrates that
increasing the number of hidden layer beyond two layers in the LSTM does not further improve the
prediction accuracy. Moreover, increasing the number of neuron in each hidden layer beyond ~ 10 neurons
does not further improve the accuracy. Finally, we also evaluated different optimization functions and found
that Nesterov-accelerated adaptive moment estimation (Nadam) (Dozat 2016) provides the best
performance.
In summary, our research presents following contributions. First, with migration of computational
resources to cloud computing within organization, the incumbent practices of security, privacy, and

1

Amazon Web Services (AWS), https://aws.amazon.com/, Date Accessed: 2018-03-12
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compliance requires transformation. Our approach contributes to the literature and research in the direction
of automating security and compliance as highlighted by various cloud standard and compliance
organizations such as Cloud Security Alliance (CSA). Second, our research also contributes to deep
learning literature by evaluating various approaches of recurrent neural network for proactive threat
prediction in cloud security environment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the research background
followed by solution approach in section 3. We present results and discussion in section 4 and conclude our
chapter in section 5.
3.2 Literature Review
There is paucity of cloud computing research addressing business challenges in Information Systems (Yang
and Tate 2012). Recent research in cloud computing has investigated the challenges inhibiting cloud
adoption in various organization (Riedl et al. 2010; Müller et al. 2015; Andriole 2012). The majority of
studies in literature have focused on cost and business agility of cloud computing and discussed its broad
advantages and risks. This adoption of cloud computing is changing the roles and responsibilities of CIOs
in organizations (Ragowsky et al. 2014). Some of the research have studied cloud computing from other
perspectives such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) (Eden et al. 2014), Human resource information
systems (HRIS) (Johnson et al. 2016), Information Technology Service Management (ITSM) (Marrone et
al. 2017), applications (Shi et al. 2016), E-commerce databases (Vandermeer et al. 2012).
There are two broader groups of literature in cloud computing research. The first group of research
is focused on challenges faced by cloud providers. This stream of research extends the grid computing
research focused on pricing and resource utilization. For example, Das et al. (2010) and Du et al (2012)
investigated the pricing mechanism in cloud spot market and present forward contract pricing to hedge
against future revenue uncertainty for cloud providers. Bapna et al. (2008) presented a market-based
resource allocation for grid computing. Moreover, Bapna et al. (2011) present a clock-and-offer auction
market for grid computing.
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The second and more recent stream of literature study cloud computing from the consumers’ perspective
and address their challenges. Fazli et al. (2018) studied the auto-scaling feature in cloud computing and its
impact on firms’ decision to enter new market, equilibrium prices, profitability, and consumer surplus using
game theory model. Cheng et al. (2016) examined the influence of latency on dynamics spot price in cloud
computing. August et al. (2014) studied the security challenges faced by SaaS providers using cloud
computing. One of the limitations of this stream of research is lack of studies examining security of cloud
consumers using data driven approaches. Our study fills this literature gap.
There has been numerous incidents of data leaks reported by cloud security firms and mainstream
media. We have highlighted some of these instances of data leaks here. Two patterns are apparent from
these incidents. First, the impact of security threats in cloud computing are ubiquitous and different
industries face similar threats. For example, in a recent report by a well know cloud security firm, a
nonprofit firm and a Bigdata firm were both exposed to data leaks due to security failure related to an AWS
data storage service. Second, the source of security events may be categorized in two categories –
misconfiguration of cloud security settings and misconfiguration of applications running in cloud
environment. For instance, the security incident related to AWS S3 is an example of misconfiguration of
cloud security settings whereas the security incident related to rsync application in cloud environment is
related to misconfiguration of applications running in cloud environment. In this chapter, we focus on the
first group of misconfigurations related to cloud security settings.
3.3 Approach
In this chapter, we present a novel framework – Cloud Computing Analytics (CCA) to address various
challenges including security, operations, and auditing using data driven approach. We present our
proposed framework in Figure 1. Cloud vendors and cloud consumers have shared management model in
which the cloud vendor and consumer overlap and are together responsible for management of IT
infrastructure. The cloud vendor provides infrastructure and tools and services for its management, whereas
the consumer is responsible for management application and operating systems. There are various solution
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providers including cloud vendor, third party organizations, and consumers who build solutions using
resources provided by the cloud provider.
There are three different resources offered by cloud providers for management of cloud
infrastructure to their customers. There resources are Application Programming Interfaces (API), event logs
and usage metrics as shown in Figure 9. Cloud solution provider and the individuals and organizations
which use the above resources to build innovative solutions to help customers manage their cloud
infrastructure. The different cloud management solutions may be classified into three categories based on
organizations providing such solutions – (a) cloud vendor, (b) cloud consumer, and (c) third party
organizations. The solution provided by these three solution provider differ in their scope of application.
Cloud vendor provide solution which may be used by any organization adopting cloud computing and is
generalizable access industries. However, the solutions developed by third party organization mostly cater
to one industry or a group of organizations. Finally, the cloud customer may build innovative solutions
using the cloud resources for problem specific to their organizations.

Figure 9. Cloud computing Analytics (CCA) framework
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The solutions presented by the providers may be broadly categorized into four solution dimensions
presented in Figure 9. These dimensions are pricing, security, operations, and IT audit. Pricing solution
dimension present solution offered by solution providers which help organization to optimize their overall
operation cost. Today, these solutions are either provided by third party organization or are built by
customer organizations themselves. Solution addressing security concerns in organizations are most critical
to all three solution providers. There are security solution offered by cloud vendors (e.g., AWS Macie),
third party organizations (e.g., AlertLogic), and individual organizations. There has been recent discussion
in research on security as-a service (Shu et al. 2015), however, there are two key limitations. Shu et al.
(2015) only present a proposal as a keynote address and is specific to only security services. However, our
CCA framework is more comprehensive including pricing, security, operations, and auditing.
The solution provided for operations management address the resource utilization and operation cost. More
recently, these solutions also help to debug cloud applications. Finally, the solution presented to assess the
business compliance are grouped as IT audit. These applications present data driven approach to measure
compliance such as PCI and HIPPA2.
In this chapter, we use event logs to build predictive models using deep learning based sequence
models for modeling and predicting unauthorized access in organizations. This is an emergent research
which applies data-driven techniques to manage cloud infrastructure for cloud users. We use event logs to
model and predict unauthorized access in cloud computing. The events logs are captured in NoSQL format
in form of JSON files. These events are ordered over time. A sample event is shown in Figure 10.
{"eventVersion":"1.01", "userIdentity":{XXX}, "eventTime":"2015-0101T14:16:25Z",
"eventSource":"cloudfront.amazonaws.com", "eventName":"ListDistributions", "awsRegion":"us-east1", "sourceIPAddress":"XXX.171.242.76", "userAgent":
"S3 Browser 4-8-7 http://s3browser.com",
"errorCode":"AccessDenied“,…}
Figure 10. Sample event log

2

For cloud compliance details, see https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/programs
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The cloud service provided by AWS which collects the logs from other cloud services within AWS
environment is called CloudTrail. CloudTrail stores history of AWS API calls initiated from AWS
management console (or AWS website), SDKs, or other libraries. Each event consist of nested group of
attributes. There are multiple key information provided in each event which includes user identity of
individuals granted access to use the service, time of the event, source of the service, location of the data
center where the service is being offered, and user agent such as browser information of the individuals
accessing the service. Some of these events which represent unsuccessful outcome also contain error code.
Based on the error code, we identify the unauthorized access events along with the event time. We aggregate
the number of access denied events at hour level.
There are three major groups of deep learning models presented in the literature. These groups are
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) (LeCun 1989), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), and Deep
Generative Model such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANS).
Recurrent neural networks (RNN) are deep learning based sequence models (Goodfellow et al.
2016) which has shown promise in predicting temporal and sequence data such as words in sentence,
language translation, stock market prediction, etc. It learns input sequence and keeps the history of past
elements in the sequence, in its hidden units to predict the next unit in the sequence. Although, the RNN
was developed to model sequences with long memories, theoretical and empirical evidence shows that it is
a challenging problem. The key challenge in learning long-term time series dependency stems from gradient
vanishing and exploding problem during learning. This challenge is addressed in Long Short Term Memory
(LSTM) model (Fakulttat & Schmidhuber 1997) by including a feedback loop in hidden neuron. We use
LSTM to predict the security threats events in cloud environment. Each neuron in a LSTM network is
represented as a LSTM cell. There are three gates in a LSTM cell. The gates are controlled using sigmoid
function whose parameters are learned during the training process. The key distinction of LSTM from RNN
is cell states who information is controlled by the three gates mentioned above.
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3.4 Data
We collected data from a medium size analytics firm using Amazon Web Service from more than five
years. We analyzed one year longitudinal data for 2015. Cloud vendors such as AWS provide logs to their
customers for operations management, security, and compliance purposes. We build a platform to gather
data using CloudTrail APIs. In cloud environment, each API access originating from any of the services
are logged using CloudTrail service. We have more than 300K events recorded for the year 2015. We
extracted events which represents an unauthorized access from this event dataset using our program written
in Python to parse the JSON files containing the event data.

Number of events

Unauthorized access events over time
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Figure 11. Hourly unauthorized access events for one day
3.5 Evaluation
We have used two evaluation criteria to compare the performance of proposed LSTM model with other
time series forecasting models such as Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA),
Autoregressive Model (AR) (Hamilton 1994), Holtwinters Model (Holt 1957; Winters 1960). First, we used
root mean square error as our first evaluation criteria shown below.

𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 (𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸) = √
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Here, 𝑦𝑡 represents the actual number of unauthorized access events in time 𝑡 and 𝑦̂𝑡 represents the number
of unauthorized access events in time 𝑡. 𝑁 represents the number of hours of prediction in test data. The
second evaluation criteria used is Mean Arctangent Absolute Percent Error (MAAPE) (Kim et al. 2016).
One of the challenges using Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE) to compare prediction models is that
the MAPE cannot be compute when the test data sample contains 0s. To address this issue, MAAPE
computes the arctangent of absolute percent error before computing the mean over the sample. The MAAPE
is defined as follows. The MAPPE is similar in interpretation to MAPE for comparing performance of
predictive models.
𝑁
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3.6 Result and Discussion
We present the comparison of performance of predictive models based on MAAPE and RMSE in Figure 4.

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

1.314262

1.31283

1.31283

Number of Events

MAAPE

The left panel in Figure 12 presents the comparison of models based on MAAPE.
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Figure 12. Comparison of prediction models based on (a) MAAPE and (b) RMSE
We find approximately 18 percent lower MAAPE for LSTM compared to ARIMA, AR, and HoltWinters
model. The right panel in Figure 4 represents the comparison of models based on RMSE. The LSTM model
has approximately 51.31 percent lower RMSE compared to ARIMA, AR, and HoltWinters model. We also
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compared different optimization functions of LSTM to determine the best optimizer function in predicting
unauthorized access events and present our result in Figure 5 based on RMSE on training and test dataset.
We have considered seven optimizer function – Adam, Stochastic Gradient Decent (SGD), RMSprop,
Adagrad, Adadelta, Adamax, Nadam. The performance of Nadam optimizer function is higher compared
to other optimizer functions as shown in Figure 13.
LSTM Optimizer evaluation (24 hours lag)
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Figure 13. Comparison of different optimizer functions in LSTM
Table 17. Performance for different lags
Lag 

1 day

2 days

Train Test

Train

3 days
Test

Train

4 days
Test

Train

5 days
Test

Train

6 days
Test

Train

7 days
Test

Train

Test

Optimizer RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE
Adam

0.58

1.09

0.58

1.09

0.57

1.07

0.57

1.07

0.56

1.08

0.56

1.09

0.57

1.09

SGD

0.61

1.17

0.62

1.19

0.62

1.19

0.62

1.20

0.62

1.20

0.61

1.20

0.62

1.21

RMSProp 0.59

1.10

0.58

1.09

0.58

1.09

0.58

1.09

0.57

1.10

0.58

1.12

0.57

1.09

Adagrad 0.59

1.12

0.59

1.11

0.58

1.09

0.57

1.08

0.57

1.10

0.57

1.09

0.57

1.10

Adadelta 0.61

1.17

0.60

1.15

0.61

1.16

0.61

1.17

0.60

1.17

0.60

1.15

0.61

1.19

Adamax 0.60

1.14

0.60

1.15

0.60

1.15

0.60

1.15

0.60

1.15

0.59

1.14

0.59

1.15

Nadam

1.05

0.56

1.05

0.56

1.06

0.56

1.07

0.54

1.07

0.53

1.07

0.53

1.08

0.57
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We also compared the performance of LSTM model based on the number of hour lags (in days) and
different optimizers, and present the results in Table 17. As we can see from Table 17, the Nadam optimizer
function outperforms other optimizer functions based on RMSE and MAAPE over different lags included
in the training model. Furthermore, we find that the performance of LSTM model does not further improve
beyond the 6 days lag. Finally, we also evaluated the performance of LSTM model for number of hidden
layers and number of neurons in hidden each layer and present the result in Figure 14. We can observe from

RMSE

Figure 14 that the 2 layers and 10 neurons in each hidden layer provides lowest RMSE for 24 hours lag.
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Figure 14. LSTM performance over hidden layers and neurons/layer
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a novel cloud computing analytics (CCA) framework to build data driven
solutions to address pricing, operations, security, and compliance challenges faced by cloud customer. We
further present model to predict unauthorized access in cloud computing environment using Long Short
Term Memory (LSTM). Our results demonstrates that the LSTM model outperforms the traditional time
series models such as ARIMA, AR, and HoldWinters. We also evaluate the performance of LSTM model
based on number of neurons in each layer, number of hidden layers, and number of lags in training and
optimization function. One of the limitation of our current research is that the performance of the current
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LSTM model is lower compared to expectation of performance for deployment in organizations. We plan
to extend the LSTM model to improve the prediction accuracy in our future work.
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Chapter 4: SCARF: Accidental Data Leak Protection in Cloud Computing
4.1 Abstract
Cloud security is of paramount importance for organizations adopting cloud computing. Recently, there
has been numerous events of data leaks in cloud environment, a.k.a., “cloud leaks” due to lack of proper
cloud security implementation within organizations which have been reported in news media. The leading
cloud providers offer data storage service in which the parent directory (or folder) name is publicly
accessible. The primary challenge is lack of masking of cloud folder name in case of accidental leaks. In
this chapter, following design science research paradigm, we present a novel secured cloud file system –
SCARF to solve the above challenge. SCARF is a cryptographic hashing-based secured file system
consisting of two layers – Control layer and Data layer. Control layer provides mapping between logical
file system consisting of folder names to a cryptographic hashed file system and vice-versa, along with
persistence of the logical file system. Data layer provides the persistence of physical file system in the cloud
environment. We evaluated our design artifact using field experiment and lab experiment. The results from
field experiment show that our proposed system reduces the external attacks compared to existing
implementation.
Keywords: Cloud computing, security, data leaks, design science
4.2 Introduction
One of the key takeaways from a recent Forrester’s data security and privacy report is that insiders continue
to cause and contribute extensively towards data breaches in organizations (Johnston et al. 2015; Shey
2016). Numerous organizations have endured data breaches due to one of the following reasons – (a)
accidently published the data; (2) hacked from outside agents; (3) inside job; (4) lost or stolen computer;
(5) poor security; and (6) social engineering. Moreover, there may be more organizations leaking data
unknowingly. The recent research highlights that the human mistakes are the key reason for such data leaks
(Shu et al. 2015). This is due to lack of training and awareness among employees on security related aspects
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of cloud computing within organizations. Moreover, data leaks have also occurred from the third-party
organizations handling information related to their clients (Upguard 2017a, 2017b).
The data breaches impact organizations on different dimensions including profit margin, market
capitalization, and the brand image (Mukhopadhyay et al. 2013). For example, in one of the recent security
breaches, an analytics firm working for Republican Party leaked the data of almost 200 million voters in
the United States due to improper cloud security settings (Upguard 2017a). In another data leak event,
personal data of 6 million customers were leaked from Verizon (CNN Money 2017). As per Upguard.com,
a leading cloud security company, one of the world’s largest corporate consulting and management firm
left at least four-cloud storage folders unsecured and publicly downloadable containing sensitive business
information (Upguard 2017b). The important pattern emerging in these cloud security leaks is that most of
these data breaches are result of human error due to inappropriate cloud security settings. Furthermore, the
intensity and frequency of these risks are likely to grow with increasing cloud adoption and growing
complexity of cloud services.
The organizations face issues of both intentional and accidental data leaks involving their
employees. The intentional data leaks from the employees are often termed as insider threat. According to
Vroom et al. (2004), accidental data leaks are of bigger concern compare to intentional data leaks. In 2001,
among the data breaches due to employees’ fault, 48 percent were accidental compared to 17 percent which
was intentionally committed. Ironically, organizations spend bigger budget to protect against outside threat
than to deal with inside security issues related to employees.
Cloud computing provides storage service which individuals and organizations may use to store
data. The two key applications of such storage service is data backup and accessibility/availability over the
Internet. To address these two customer requirements, the cloud vendors provide domain name service
(DNS) compliant storage wherein the files and folders are accessed using URL over the Internet. For
example, Amazon Web Services (AWS), a leading cloud vendor provides storage service – Simple Storage
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Service or S33, which customers may use to store both unstructured and structured data. The customers
store data in a hierarchical structure of folders, which may contain either files or subfolders. The root folder
or the folder without any parent folder is termed as “Bucket”. AWS requires unique bucket names across
all her customers.
Customers can specify the security access settings of cloud folders as private or public depending
on their business requirements. If the customers’ intention is to expose the data over the Internet then she
could specify the access setting of her folder as public which will transform the data folder in to website.
On the other hand, if the data is deemed confidential or sensitive by the customer, she can keep the security
setting of the data folder as private. The folders containing sensitive information, which are publicly
exposed, pose a grave threat to their organizations.
One of the key challenges is that both private and public names are discoverable which weakens
the security of data in case of accidental change of privacy settings of the bucket from private to public.
There has been growing number of malicious agents, a.k.a., Bucket finders4, which search for organizations’
publicly exposed S3 buckets with sensitive information. Once an organizations’ bucket is publicly exposed,
bucket finders can discover them using dictionary-based attacks in which the malicious agent searches for
names similar to the names of target organizations using the cloud access APIs. Moreover, malicious agents
may also discover the private buckets; however, the data is not accessible. This exposure of names of private
buckets further weaken the security of the storage service by providing point of attack to the malicious
agents. For example, a data folder with name ‘abc’ can be accessed using the URL
‘http://abc.s3.amazonaws.com.’
To answer the above research challenge, we following design science methodology (Jaeger et al.
2015) to build a novel framework and algorithms to help organizations reduce the risk of accidental cloud

3

AWS (2017). Amazon S3, https://aws.amazon.com/s3/
Aaron Klein (2012). AWS S3 bucket and bucket finder, https://cloudcheckr.com/2012/05/aws-s3-buckets-bucketfinder/
4
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storage folder exposure in public domain. Moreover, our framework also protects the private buckets from
discovery by malicious agents over the Internet (US Provisional patent No. 62/628,367). We present a novel
secured cloud file system – SCARF, which is a dual layer secured hashing-based file system to solve the
above challenge. In the current cloud environment, individuals and organizations provide commonly used
names or their organizational names as identifier of the data folder name.

Figure 15. Screenshot of web access to ‘abc’ folder. [date accessed: 01/30/2019]
The malicious agents running dictionary-based attack or similar approaches can easily trace these buckets,
and further obtain the stored data if the folder is accidently exposed in public domain. SCARF creates and
stores the data folders using cryptographic hash function – SHA 224 hashing along with a 128-bit random
salt and iterations. We append the random salt to the name of the bucket before hashing to strengthen the
hashing. Moreover, we rehash the hash of the folder and salt for number of times equal to number of
iterations, which we assign more than 100,000 as per the best practices (citation required). This prohibits
the malicious agents in determining the source of the document and makes the dictionary-based attacks
futile. Furthermore, we present algorithms for accessing data using our novel framework.
In summary, our research makes following contributions to the literature. First, we present a novel
IT framework and an artifact – SCARF to reduce the likelihood of discovery of confidential data leaks by
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92.59 percent in case of accidental exposure of sensitive cloud storage data. Our approach enhances the
security of private data folders by masking the names of the cloud storage folders using state-of-art hashing,
salt, and iterations. Third, we provide novel algorithms to access data in our proposed framework. Third,
our solution is a cloud-based system, which can easily scale based on organizational growth and business
demand. Finally, the solution also provides protection against insider leaks in case of incorrect access
policies.
We organize rest of the chapter as follows. In section 2, we provide comprehensive literature review
followed by research background of the cloud storage services, their working and security challenges. In
section 3, we present our approach followed by proposed evaluation framework in section 4. In section 5,
we discuss our expected contributions followed by conclusion in section 6.
4.3 Related Work
There has been gradual increase in number of data leaks in the recent years. However, very few of these
leaks get reported in the mainstream new websites (Loch et al. 1992a). Accidental leaks and unintentional
unauthorized access to sensitive data and its disclosure is an important threat to Information systems
(Johnston et al., 2015). These threats lead to customer service deterioration of affected organization and
even corporate failure in some cases.
There has been some research on detecting cloud leaks and extending such approaches as services
(Shu and Yao 2012; Shu et al. 2015). These papers have used a partial message digest to match and detect
sensitive data over the network. Our approach is different from this steam of literature in two ways.
Loch et al. (1992b) argue that the Protection Motivation Theory explains behavioural change at
personal level. To apply this theory to achieve better safety for organizational assets, the fear appeal must
include personal sanctions to make it more personal. Moreover, some of the studies have investigated
misuse of IS asserts which is different from accidental leaks which is not intentional. Therefore, theories
such as deterrence theory and its extensions will not be applicable in this context. Feal appeal literature
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provides approach to change the behavioural intension of an individual. However, we are evaluating the a
security system in our research.
Loch et al. (2017) investigates the concerns of MIS executives related to Information systems
threats and demonstrates that there is a wide gap in understanding of MIS executives between the use of a
new technology and its security implications. Moreover, there is lack of understanding of highly connected
contemporary technologies among executives as they still recognise the current threats from preconnectivity era. Apart from lack of understanding of security related issues by top executives, there are
cases related to weak implementation of industry best practices by organizations (Kioon et al. 2013; Blue
et al. 2017; Zheng & Jin 2012).
Our approach borrows from the extant literature on protecting password using hashing techniques
(Blue et al. 2017). Recently, one of the global Internet companies lost one billion user credentials due its
weak and obsolete security mechanism implementation. In one of research studying password hashing, Blue
et al. (2017) proposed a novel approach involving salt, one-way hashing, and iterations to secure the
passwords in insecure systems. Our approach is similar in concept to Blue et al. (2017), Ah Kioon et al.
(2013), and Zheng & Jin (2012), however, there are key differences. Unlike conventional approach, which
used such concept to protect passwords, we present a novel framework to protect cloud data storage folder
in case of accidental data leaks due to human errors. Moreover, the purpose of hashing based password
security is to protect the original password from malicious agents, we build a duel-layer framework to help
user in accessing cloud data securely along with maintaining the original names.
There have been different password hashing techniques presented in the extant literature including
Message Digest 5 (MD5) (Ratna et al. 2013) and Secured Hash Algorithms (SHA). However, recent
literature by Ratna et al. (2013) has documented security weakness in MD5 hashing algorithm. Moreover,
the SHA family of hashing algorithms, especially SHA-1 has been tested to have better security against
brute-force attacks which aim to extract information from the cryptographic hash (Teat & Peltsverger 2011).
However, in the recent research, authors have demonstrated the weakness in SHA-1 hashing (Boonkrong
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& Somboonpattanakit 2016). There are other alternatives to store password in database and it is important
to visit those techniques to understand their weakness. This understanding may be useful to assess the
security of the proposed technique in our research compared to other alternatives. First, the weakest form
of password protection is to store the password in plain text (Boonkrong & Somboonpattanakit 2016). In
case of data leak, the passwords stored in the database will be revealed directly to malicious agents. In case
of encrypted password in which the password is stored using private key encryption technique, the
passwords are not revealed to the malicious agents directly. However, if the key is also stored in the same
database, in case of data leak, it is highly likely that the malicious agent will obtain the key and can decrypt
the passwords. Therefore, symmetric key encryption based techniques look promising, however, it is not a
secured technique in this context. Third, hashing-based techniques to store the password are better
compared to encryption-based techniques because there is no single key which is point of vulnerability.
Platform providers can store the hash of password and every time when a user requires authentication, the
platform hashes the user password and performs a match with the stored hash for authentication (Kioon et
al. 2013).
The hashing-based technique to store passwords is more secured compared to plain-text and
encryption-based techniques mentioned above, however, hashing-based technique is vulnerable to other
forms of malicious attacks. First, the malicious agents may use pre-computed hash table, known as rainbow
table attack (citation required), to search and find the password. Moreover, there is constant growth in the
size of rainbow table which makes even longer password vulnerable to this attack.
To reduce the attack using rainbow tables, two approaches are used, often together, to secure the
passwords. The hashes are computed iteratively, and the number of iterations is a large number (>100000)
(Boonkrong & Somboonpattanakit 2016). In this case, the rainbow table cannot be computed if the number
of interactions is not known to the malicious agent. Moreover, it increases the time to compute the hash.
Therefore, the number of iterations chosen depends on the application time sensitivity and security. The
other technique is to use a salt or a random number and append to each password before hashing
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(Gauravaram 2013). This technique of using random salt for each password along with iterations to increase
the time to prepare rainbow table is state-of-art security model. We adapt this framework for our secured
cloud file system. For further analysis of cryptographic hash function using salt, see Dworkin (2015).
The most recent standard in the SHA family of algorithm is SHA-3 (Dworkin 2015). It consists of
four cryptographic hash functions – SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 along with two
extendible output functions – SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. The prior group of hash functions in SHA
family which is widely used in practice is SHA-2 which consists of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA512, SHA-512/224, and SHA-512/256. The number of the dash symbol (“-”) in the name of has function
represents the length of digest in bits. For example, the length of digest for SHA-224 is 224 bits. Apart from
fixed length digest functions, SHA family of functions also provide extendable-output function (XOF)
whose digest output is user defined. The message digest lengths approved by the Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) are 160 bits, 224 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, and 512 bits (Gauravaram, 2013). For
nonstandard digest length application, extendible-output functions are recommended.
4.4 Background
Public cloud providers offer Software as-a service (SaaS) based storage services to customers over the
Internet. They provide storage for structured, semi-structured and unstructured data. For structured data,
traditional relational databased are offered as-a service. For semi-structured data, recent key-value pair
based databases are offered as-a service. In this chapter, we focus on the unstructured data storage, which
are offered as file system storage.
One of the leading public cloud provider, Amazon Web Services (AWS), provides storage for
unstructured data called Simple storage or S3. Other major public cloud providers such as Microsoft Azure
also provide similar services. The unstructured data storage service over the cloud provides customer to
create data folders, similar to folders on a personal computers and store their content as files and subfolders
within the parent folder or root folder. The parent folder or root folder is the folder, which does not has
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parent folder. In AWS S3 service, the name of the parent folder is required to be unique across all customers.
This constraint may leak names of data folders to malicious agents.
This XML file does not appear to have any style information associated with it. The document tree is
shown below.
<Error>
<Code>AccessDenied</Code>
<Message>Access Denied</Message>
<RequestId>10DB6530EE62F9A6</RequestId>
<HostId>
VU2n8Y6Ha9003UdVnKxpSw+KqkDPJHc+MfZz/maf304Rb8Z+Bd0PncJPjMpkkSN9Maqts
2Ev0XA=
</HostId>
</Error>
Figure 16. Error message for accessing a private cloud folder
To demonstrate this issue, we created an example S3 folder – “testbucket-123-986” with private
security setting, which is the default setting. In case of private security setting, individuals without having
permission to the folder cannot access the data. Further, we included a text file – “confidential.txt” in the
folder. Customers can access the folders using folder URL over the Internet. For example, we can access
our exemplar folder using “https://testbucket-123-986.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com” and the error message
in shown in Figure 16. The error message is “Access Denied”.
Now, we access a folder which does not exists on the platform – “https://testbucket-123-986doesnotexist.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com” (accessed 01/23/2018) and Figure 17 presents the error
message. The error message in case of non-existing bucket is “The specified bucket does not exist”.
This XML file does not appear to have any style information associated with it. The document tree is
shown below.
<Error>
<Code>NoSuchBucket</Code>
<Message>The specified bucket does not exist</Message>
<BucketName>testbucket-123-986-doesnotexist</BucketName>
<RequestId>74BEB4387D5A741D</RequestId>
<HostId>
QkeaZT1BOCPLrf7skJpMBvBH/4X55wZq759+4rCi00uFOTTRhjH85FSpu5tZytDsNhi/w
gg/WXg=
</HostId>
</Error>
Figure 17. Error message for accessing a non-existing cloud folder
96

This XML file does not appear to have any style information associated with it. The document tree is
shown below.
<ListBucketResult xmlns="http://s3.amazonaws.com/doc/2006-03-01/">
<Name>testbucket-123-986</Name>
<Prefix/>
<Marker/>
<MaxKeys>1000</MaxKeys>
<IsTruncated>false</IsTruncated>
<Contents>
<Key>confidential.txt</Key>
<LastModified>2018-01-19T21:20:51.000Z</LastModified>
<ETag>"d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"</ETag>
<Size>0</Size>
<StorageClass>STANDARD</StorageClass>
</Contents>
</ListBucketResult>
Figure 18. Data exposure in case of public cloud folders
As we can observe from error message in Figure 1 and 2 that any malicious agent can easily trace if a folder
with a specific name of interest exists on the cloud platform or not. Further, if the security setting of the
private folder is set to public, the data with the folder is accessible over the Internet and the malicious agents
with the folder name can easily access the data as shown in Figure 18.
Further, we performed a simple search for cloud folder names with the name of companies listed
in S&P 100 and present in Table 18, which are existing on the cloud platform (accessed on 01/23/2018).
We cannot confirm if these folders indeed belong to these organizations. However, a similar simple search
may reveal the names of any folders and verify if the folder exists on the platform. This motivates our
research problem.
4.5 Methodology
In this chapter, we present a duel-layer secured cloud file system – SCARF, which protects the customers’
data from the bucket finding softwares and other similar approaches. In SCARF, the two layers are Control
Layer and Data Layer. Control Layer is responsible for masking (via hashing) the data storage name.
Moreover, it stores the hashed name and the actual name (name provided by the user) in a non-relational
database or a NoSQL database. Further, the Control Layer passes the user data and hashed folder name to
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the Data Layer for the persistence in cloud storage. The data is persisted in a flat file data storage services
in the cloud such as S3 service provided by AWS. We provide the detailed functionality of the Control
Layer and Data Layer in the following subsections. The detailed architecture diagram of SCARF is depicted
in the Figure 1.
Table 18. Search results of cloud folders
Organization name

Cloud folder name

Error message

Bank of America Corp

https://bofa.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

Citigroup Inc

https://citigroup.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

Goldman Sachs

https://goldmansachs.s3.amazonaws.com

AllAccessDisabled

General Motors

https://generalmotors.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

Morgan Stanley

https://morganstanley.s3.amazonaws.com

AllAccessDisabled

Wells Fargo

https://wellsfargo.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

Metlife Inc.

https://metlife.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

CVS Health

https://cvshealth.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

United Health

https://unitedhealth.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

Capital One Financial Corp

https://capitalonefinancial.s3.amazonaws.com

AccessDenied

There are existing encryption-based file systems provided by different organizations5 to consumers
for encrypting their data user devices such as laptop and desktop. Such secured file systems are useful to
protect users from other unauthorized access to the physical device. Moreover, these secured file systems
use symmetric-key based encryption technique to encrypt the data. The legitimate user (s) have access to
the key which they can use the decrypt the data. However, there are multiple challenges in adopting such
system for the cloud file system security. First, organizations using cloud storage mostly operate in a

5

CryFS file system, https://www.cryfs.org/
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multiuser environment in which the private key has to be shared with multiple individuals in the
organization, which is a security weakness. Second, the key, which is most likely stored in the cloud
environment, may be accidently leaked along with the data, and makes the security of data vulnerable.
Third, in case of changes of the user policies for data access, a separate key needs to be generated and
distributed to the existing users of the system. Finally, there is an existing user based policy management
service6 provided by the cloud providers to maintain the access to respective files. However, our approach
does not suffer from these challenges. The SCARF system is secured in case of accidental leak of hashes
and their corresponding salt. Moreover, there are no keys, which need to be shared with multiple users to
access the data, hence, our approach is inherently multiuser. Furthermore, our approach is compatible with
the existing file permission services provided by cloud provider responsible user access management.
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API commands

SCARF

NoSQL Database

Control Layer
Salt

Root Folder
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(Root folder creation)

New Root Folder Hash

Mapping
Control layer
persistence

(Other commands)

Existing Root Folder Hash

Flat File System

Root Folder Hash is
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persistence

Data Layer

Figure 19. SCARF architecture diagram

6

For example, IAM is a user identity management service provided by AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/iam/
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Control Layer
Cryptographic Hashing
Any cryptographic hash function should provide three security properties – collision resistant, second
preimage resistant, and preimage resistant (2007). In SCARF, the cloud data storage name provided by the
user via application interface (APIs) or command line is hashed using a secured hash SHA224 along with
a random 128-bit string, a.k.a. salt. We further improve the strength of hashing by performing iterative
hashing in which we rehash the previously generated hash.
Our approach is better compare to hashing techniques without salt because it reduces the likelihood
of successful brute-force attack. In case of applications, directly using hashing algorithms such as SHA, a
malicious agent can apply brute-force technique in which it check different likely combinations of data and
checks with the hash. Moreover, the time required to create a hash of a given string is lower in case of direct
hash function than secured hashes using hashing, salt, and iterations. The input to PBKDF includes a secret
value (data storage name in this instance), a salt and the number of iterations. For our proof-of-concept
(POC) implementation, we used hashlib7 Python library to perform the secured hash using
hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac() function. We choose SHA224 hashing algorithm due limitation of number of
characters which can be used represent a folders’ name over the cloud computing platform. However, our
framework and algorithms can work on any other hashing algorithm with any changes.
Salt is a fixed or random data/number, and is concatenated with the password unique hash keys. In
our POC implementation, we use a random number generator function to generate random salt of 128 bytes
suitable for cryptographic use. Using a salt of 128 bytes, we can create approximately 2128 possible keys for
a given storage name. The use of random salt prohibits the malicious agent from using pre-computed hash
tables or rainbow table for determining the name of the cloud folder and makes each hash of each bucket

7

https://docs.python.org/3/library/hashlib.html
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unique even if they have identical name. Moreover, it also increases the time required to compute the hash
for the malicious agent, which further reduces the efficiency of malicious attack. Furthermore, a longer salt
of 128 bytes is better than smaller length salt. We used urandom() Python function available with OS8
library to generate salt. We did not choose regular random number generators because urandom() function
has been implement in different operating systems specifically for cryptographic purpose.
The number of iterations, denoted as iterations, is a fixed number that determines how many times
the hashing function iterates to generate the key. A minimum iteration count of 100000 is recommended in
the SCARF. The output of the key derivation function, the key digest communicated to the Data Layer that
handles data persistence in the flat file system provided by the cloud vendor.
Control Layer persistence
In case of new folder creation using SCARF, we store the actual folder name provided by the customer,
salt, and number of iterations in a non-relational data based called Control Layer persistence. We keep
redundant copies of this database avoid single point of failure and improve the overall efficiency of the
system. We choose NoSQL database over other relational databases for Control Layer persistence because
a file system is a semi-structured data, which is similar to an n-array list and can be stored in a NoSQL
database. In our POC implementation, we use DynamoDB9, which is a scalable AWS NoSQL database.
When user queries for an existing folder, the mapping function determines the corresponding hash
key for the given data storage name. The mapping function is a lookup function searches for the storage
name and the corresponding key value in the NoSQL database. We have used linear research in the mapping
function in our POC; however, a more efficient lookup function can be included as well.

8

https://docs.python.org/2/library/os.html

9

https://aws.amazon.com/dynamodb/
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Data Layer
The data layer manages data persistence in the cloud storage/flat file system. It receives the hash key
corresponding to folder names from the control layer and uses the appropriate underlying cloud services to
persist the users’ data.
4.6 Data Access algorithms
In this section, we provide the detailed algorithms for accessing data in SCARF. We have provided
algorithm for creating a cloud data folder, deleting a cloud data folder, listing cloud data folders, copying
data from one data folder to another and downloading data from the cloud data folder. For POC, we can
provided implementation for all standard cloud operations over S3 data storage service provided by AWS.
We query root table for the JSON file, which contains the list of names of buckets and other
information such as the number of iterations to be used in hashing. These details are provided by the
user/administrator while creating the root table. Moreover, we use SHA 224 hashing algorithm in this
implementation since the S3 bucket names are restricted to a length of 63 characters as per the naming
conventions10 and using higher SHA algorithms11 such as SHA 256 and above produces a longer hash
digest.
We use a password-based key derivation function (PBKDF2_HMAC) using SHA 224 for hashing
or masking, which takes the bucket name as an input along with the salt and number of iterations. The salt
is generated using a random bit generator function urandom12 in Python. The length of the randomly
generated salt is 128 bytes. The output of the key derivation function is a hash digest of the given bucket
name which is then passed onto the corresponding underlying data layer which is the API to create the S3

10

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/dev/BucketRestrictions.html

11

Hashing using SHA 256 and above will be added in the next implementation

12

https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.html
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bucket with the hash name. Once the bucket has been created successfully, the details are updated in the
JSON file present in the root table.
Algorithm 1. Create data folder
INPUT : credentials , folderName, iterations, controlLayerPersistence
OUTPUT : success/failure
1.
client = createClient (controlLayerPersistence, credentials)
2.
jsonFile = getItem(client, rootTable)
3.
iterations = getIteration(jsonFile)
4.
FOR bucket record in jsonFile:
5.
IF(folder name exists):
6.
print(Error message: 'Folder Already Exists')
7.
EXIT
8.
END IF
9.
END FOR
10.
salt = randomSaltGenerator()
11.
folderHash = hash(folderName, salt, iterations)
12.
createFolderOutput = createBucket(folderHash)
13.
IF createFolderOutput:
14.
updateControlLayer(folderName, folderHash, salt, iterations)
15.
ELSE:
16.
print(Error message : ‘Folder could not be created’)
17.
END IF
We compare the given folder name with the list of folder names from the JSON file and get the
corresponding bucket hash which is then passed on to the underlying data layer (API) to delete the S3
folder. Once the folder has been deleted successfully, the bucket details are deleted from the JSON file
present in the control layer persistence table. If the given bucket name is not present in the JSON file, we
pass the (original) bucket name to the underlying data layer. The list folder command provides all folders
as well as listing all the files/subfolders in a given parent folder. For listing all the folder names, we get the
list of folder names from the data layer API. For each of the folders returned, we get the corresponding
hashes from the JSON file and print out the folder hash along with the original folder name and the last
modified time.
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Algorithm 2. Delete data folder
INPUT: credentials , folderName, controlLayerPersistence
OUTPUT : success/failure
1.
client = createClient (controlLayerPersistence, credentials)
2.
jsonFile = getItem(client, controlLayerPersistence)
3.
FOR folder record in jsonFile:
4.
IF(folderName exists):
5.
folderHash = folder.Hash
6.
END IF
7.
END FOR
8.
IF folderHash:
9.
output = deleteFolder(folderHash)
10.
IF output:
11.
updateControlLayer(folderName)
12.
END IF
13. ELSE:
14.
deleteFolder(bucketFolder)
15. END IF

Algorithm 3. List data folders
INPUT
: credentials , folderName, rootTable
OUTPUT : List of files in the folder/List of folders
1.
client = createClient (controlLayerPersistence, credentials)
2.
jsonFile = getItem(client, controlLayerPersistence)
3.
IF(folderName in arguments passed):
4.
FOR folder record in jsonFile:
5.
IF(folderName exists):
6.
folderHash = folder.Hash
7.
END IF
8.
END FOR
9.
listObjects(folderHash)
10. ELSE:
11.
listFolders()
12. END IF

For listing files/subfolders under a given folder name, we get the corresponding folder hash from JSON file
and call the underlying data layer with the folder hash.
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Using the copy data command, we can transfer files/subfolders from local directory on a computer
to any cloud folder, cloud folder to local directory and one cloud folder to another cloud folder. If the source
or the destination provided in the command is a cloud folder name, we get the corresponding hash from the
JSON file and call the underlying data layer with the folders’ hash.
Algorithm 4. Copy data from one data folder to another
INPUT
: credentials , folderName, controlLayerPersistence, source, destination
OUTPUT : success/failure
1.
client = createClient (controlLayerPersistence, credentials)
2.
jsonFile = getItem(client, controlLayerPersistence)
3.
IF(source is Folders):
4.
FOR folder record in jsonFile:
5.
IF(folderName exists):
6.
source = folder.Hash
7.
END IF
8.
END FOR
9.
END IF
10.
IF(destination is folder):
11.
FOR folder record in jsonFile:
12.
IF(folderName exists):
13.
destination = folder.Hash
14.
END IF
15.
END FOR
16.
END IF
17.
copyObjects(source, destination)
Get object command is used to download data from a cloud folder. For a given folder name, we get the
corresponding hash from the JSON file and call the underlying data layer with the folder hash. If the folder
name is not present in the JSON file, we pass the (original) folder name to the underlying data layer.
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Algorithm 5. Get data from data folder to outside cloud computing environment
INPUT
: credentials , folderName, fileName, controlLayerPersistence
OUTPUT : Contents of the file
1.
client = createClient (controlLayerPersistence, credentials)
2.
jsonFile = getItem(client, controlLayerPersistence)
3.
FOR folder record in jsonFile:
4.
IF(folderName exists):
5.
folderHash = folder.Hash
6.
END IF
7.
END FOR
8.
IF folderHash:
9.
getObjects(folderHash, fileName)
10.
ELSE:
11.
getObjects(folderName, fileName)
12.
END IF
4.7 Implementation
Command Line
AWS s3 and s3api commands

SCARF

Amazon DynamoDB

Control Layer
Salt

Bucket Name

Cryptographic
Hashing

Mapping

(Bucket creation)

(Other S3 Commands)

New Bucket Hash

Control layer
persistence

Amazon S3

Existing Bucket Hash

Bucket Hash is
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persistence
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Figure 20. Scarf implementation diagram
We have implemented the proposed SCARF system and integrated with Amazon AWS for the proof-ofconcept (POC). The implementation architecture is shown in Figure 20. In the following figures 3-14, we
demonstrate the working of the SCARF system and compare it with the existing system. We demonstrate
using the screenshots that there is no additional overhead in terms of usability of the SCARF system over
the existing system.

106

Figure 21 presents the implantation of creating a new data folder for both SCARF and Original
implementation. The interface command to create the data folder in SCARF is similar to Original
implementation. A user provides a name of the data folder to the system. In case of original implementation,
a data folder with the same name is created in cloud environment.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 21. Screenshots – Create folder command
However, in case of SCARF, the data folders name is cryptographically hashed and then this name is used
to create the cloud storage folder. For example, a cloud storage folder name ‘s3api-test123’ is converted to
‘937bc29b69…a638’ and a cloud data folder is created with the cryptographically hashed name. Finally,
the folder name and its cryptographic hash is stored in DynamoDB database as shown in Figure 20.
(c) SCARF

(d) Original implementation

Figure 22. Screenshots – Remove folder command
Figure 22 shows the second important process of deleting or removing a data storage folder from cloud
environment. One key observation is that in SCARF, we provide the real folder name and not the
cryptographic hash which is similar to the original implementation. This shows that customers using
SCARF do not need to consider cryptographic hash in this operation which makes SCARF as convenient
as the original implementation for deleting a data folder. One key difference between the SCARF and
original implementation for deleting a folder is that in case of original implementation, the data folder name
which is provided by customer is removed directly from the cloud storage. On the other hand, in case of
SCARF, the data folder name is first used to fetch its corresponding cryptographic hash name from
DynamoDB as shown in Figure 20. Then, the SCARF system deletes the data folder with cryptographic
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hash name. Finally, the mapping of the data folder name and its cryptographic hash is removed from the
DynamoDB database.
Figure 23. Screenshots – List folders command presents the listing of existing folders for a
customer. As you can observe from the screenshots of implementation of this process in 5(a) and 5(b) for
SCARF and original implementation respectively, the listing of folder in our proposed system is similar to
original implementation. The original implementation lists the names of the folder, whereas, SCARF lists
names of the folders along with its cryptographic hashes of these folders.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 23. Screenshots – List folders command
In case of original implementation, the list operation directly presents the names of the folders from cloud
storage, however, in SCARF, the folder names and its corresponding hashes are presented from DynamoDB
which stores the logical filesystem.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 24. Screenshots – Copy files from one folder to another folder command
Figure 24 presents the copying of data from the host folder to the cloud folder. The command in both
SCARF and existing implementation is similar. In case of original implementation, the file is transferred to
the target data folder directly. However, in case of SCARF, first the cryptographic hashed name is retrieved
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corresponding to the folder name provided by the customer from the DynamoDB which stores logical file
system. Then the file is transferred to the cryptographic hashed folder name.
In Figure 26, the screenshot shows the process to copy data from a cloud folder to the local
computer. The command to copy the file in SCARF is similar to original implementation. As shown in
Figure 8, the data file ‘testdoc1.txt’ which is stored in cloud folder ‘s3api-test’ is copied to the local
computer.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 25. Screenshots – Move data from local machine to cloud folder command
In the original implementation, the data is copied directly from the cloud folder, however, in SCARF
implementation, the data folder name is used to retrieve its corresponding cryptographic hashed name from
the DynamoDB containing logical file system. The data is then copied from the cryptographic hashed folder
to the local computer. In Figure 7, the process to move the file local computer to the cloud folder is similar
to copying of file presented in Figure 8, however, in case of move, the folder name and its cryptographic
hash is stored in logical file system and data is stored in physical file system.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 26. Screenshots – Copy command from cloud folder to local directory
In Figure 26. Screenshots – Copy command from cloud folder to local directory, we present the
implementation comparison of a file from a cloud folder to the local computer. In case of original
implementation, the data file is first copied from the cloud folder to the local computer and the file is delete
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from the physical file system. In case of SCARF, we first fetch the cryptographic name of the folder and
then move the data file from the cryptographic folder name to the local directory.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 27. Screenshots – Move files cloud folder to local directory
The above figures represents an alternate implementation of create, list, object copy, access control list and
listing objects using ‘s3api’ compared to ‘s3’ presented above. Figure 28 shows process of fetching access
control list corresponding to a data storage folder. The key distinction between the original implementation
and SCARF implementation is that in case of original implementation, the access control list is fetched
directly by providing the name of folder. However, in case of SCARF, we first retrieve the corresponding
cryptographic name of the cloud folder from the DynamoDB – logical file systems, and then the access
control is retrieved from the data layer for the cryptographic folder name.
(a) SCARF

(b) Original implementation

Figure 28. Screenshots – Get folder access command
4.8 Evaluation
Field Study
We tested our system using filed study. To validate the effectiveness of our system compared to the existing
system, we conducted A/B testing. We created data storage folders using our proposed system and existing
system. We left both folders over the internet from May 2018 to August 2018. We logged the unauthorized
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access events on these folders using the logging service provided by the cloud platform. The result of the
A/B test is presented in Figure 2. As we can see, both folders were accessed from authorized users during
the time of field study. This is an empirical validation of the problem addressed in this chapter that the
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Figure 29. Comparison of Unauthorized access for Scarf and existing system
Moreover, we can see from the Figure 29 than the number of attempts to access information from cloud
storage folders created using our proposed system – Scarf is lower compared to the existing system over
the duration of study. Finally, another important observation from our results is that the access to these
folders decreases over time. One plausible explanation might be that the malicious agents might cache the
information initially gathered. This results also demonstrates that our solution make it difficult for malicious
agents to identity of data storage folder’s ownership and reduces the attempt made by malicious external
agents to access data from cloud storage. We performed bootstrapped on sided t-test to test if the external
access on the existing system is greater than the proposed system. We find that the number of external
access on exiting system is significantly greater than (1.79, p=0.06) compared to the proposed system. We
used bootstrap method due to small sample size with random sampling of 50 from each group (Efron et al.
1994).
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Performance Evaluation
We evaluated our proposed systems’ performance based on the access time and storage requirement. The
proposed systems stores the logical file system in a NoSQL database which is an additional storage required
to store the meta-data regarding the folder structure. Moreover, since our system is placed in between the
cloud customer and cloud vendor, the customer may incur addition time in accessing the file system. We
evaluated the performance of our system on both these dimension and present our results below.
We plot the performance comparison of existing system and our proposed Scarf system on three
key operation involving cloud storage – create folder, list folders, and delete folder. We generated different
load scenarios and applied on our proposed system and existing systems. To test create folder operation,
we created 10, 20, 30… 90 folders at once and monitored the response time for both systems under
evaluation. We did not test beyond 90 folders since a user cannot create more than 100 folders at once. In
list folder operation, we listed these folders and monitored the response time. Finally, in delete folder
operation, we deleted these folders and noted the response time.
We present the results of evaluation time for create folder, list folder, and delete folder in the Figure
20. The create folder command in our proposed system takes approximately 2.11 seconds to create on data
folder. Moreover, it takes 0.003 seconds to access or list a data folder in our proposed system. Finally, it
takes 1.85 seconds to delete an empty data folder in our proposed system.
We performed Chi-square test to statistically compare the performance results and present the
results in Table 19. The difference in performance of scarf and existing system is significant for creating
and deleting storage folders. This is expected since the creating of the folders involve cryptographic hashing
function which requires additional time to create the cryptographic hash.
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Figure 30. Comparison of Scarf with existing implementation
User Evaluation
Fear appeal frameworks to promote security compliance within organizations have been studied in
Information Systems literature (Johnston et al. 2015). Such frameworks were first applied in healthcare and
public safety domains to deter users from activities such as smoking and persuade them to use seat belts.
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However, one of the limitations of such frameworks is that they work in issues related to personal wellbeing and may not apply at protecting organizational assets (Johnston et al. 2015).
Table 19. Comparison of Scarf and existing implementation
Table 2. Comparison of Scarf and existing implementation
Operation

Chi-square test (p-value)

Result

Create storage folders

<0.001

Significant

List storage folders

0.997

Non-significant

Delete storage folders

<0.001

Significant

We follow Gregor and Jones (2017) and Venkatesh at al. (2017) present three theoretically
motivated propositions. Security belief towards an IT system has been studied by Venkatesh et al. (2017)
and Smith et al. (2011) wherein three dimensions of security belief are considered. First, privacy concerns
(Olivero and Lunt 2004) which are influenced by the unauthorized use of data, impact attitude and
intentions of users. In case of system providing data protection in events of accidental data leaks will have
lower privacy concerns compared to system without such protection. Moreover, higher privacy concerns
lead to lower trust in the system and higher risk perceptions towards the systems (Venkatest et al. 2017).
The system providing data protection in events of accidental data leaks will gain higher customers’ trust
and will show lower risk perceptions compared to system without such protection. Therefore, we posit
following propositions:
Proposition 1: Cloud computing users will have lower privacy concerns for SCARF cloud storage system
compared to existing cloud storage system.
Proposition 2: Cloud computing users will have higher trust for SCARF cloud storage system compared to
existing cloud storage system.
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Proposition 3: Cloud computing users will have lower risk perceptions towards SCARF storage system
compared to existing cloud storage system.
We evaluated our novel cloud security framework using a 2 × 1 factorial experiment design
targeting IT developers. We conducted within-subject analysis in which all participants were presented with
both SCARF and existing system. We provided details of the working of both existing system and our
proposed system in random order. Moreover, we presented a task to create, list, and delete data storage
folders using the both systems in the experiment. After completing the task the participants answered the
questionnaire. Our initial experiment sample consists of 33 participants from a MIS graduate program with
minimum one year of IT industry experience from an international university. The graduate MIS population
is a representative sample of our target population of cloud computing users. We measure our constructs
using reliable scales from the literature (Vroom et al. 2004).
To analyse the data, we conducted paired sample t-test using R software. We present the box plots
across three constructs in Figure 31. Comparison between two experimental conditions for different
constructs. We have summarized the results of the propositions in
Table 20. As we can see from
Table 20, Propositions 1-3 are supported.

(a) Privacy concern

(b) Trust

(a) Risk perception

Figure 31. Comparison between two experimental conditions for different constructs
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Table 20. Proposition test
Proposition
Proposition 1: Cloud computing users will have lower privacy
concerns for SCARF cloud storage system compared to existing
cloud storage system.
Proposition 2: Cloud computing users will have higher trust for
SCARF cloud storage system compared to existing cloud storage
system.
Proposition 3: Cloud computing users will have lower risk
perceptions towards SCARF storage system compared to existing
cloud storage system.

t-test
t=8.23, p-value=
<0.001

Result
Supported

t = -12.421, pvalue= < 0.001

Supported

t = 10.532, pvalue = <0.001

Supported

4.9 Discussion
There is increasing interest in examining digital platforms in Information Systems research (Constantinides
2018). Cloud computing is an important digital infrastructure which enables majority of these digital
platforms by providing necessary computing and networking resources. However, there is paucity of
research addressing the business challenges related to cloud management for consumers including pricing,
security, operations, and compliance (Yang and Tate 2012). Our research contributes to this much needed
research in security of digital infrastructure.
One of the key properties of digital infrastructure is its generalizability across industries
(Constantinides 2018). The important implication of this property is that the solution presented to solve the
business challenges are generalizable across industries and geographical locations.
Organizations have been recently considering on outsourcing of security breach detection and
prevention (Cezer et al. 2013). Cezer et al. (2013) categorize security breach response systems into two
categories – prevention systems and detection system. Our solution may be included as part of security
breach prevention software of third-party cloud management service platforms which assist organizations
to optimally and securely manage their cloud infrastructure.
4.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a novel cloud security framework, SCARF, to protect customers’ data in case of
accidental leaks in the cloud-computing environment. In our proposed framework, we perform secured
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hashing of parent folders’ name of the data storage using multiple iteration of state-of-art cryptographic
hash function (SHA 224) along with random salt of 128-bits for each of the folder names to provide security
against most recent security vulnerability including rainbow table attack. The proposed system is a duellayer framework consisting of Control Layer and Data Layer. Control Layer is responsible for cryptographic
hashing and persistence of the folder name, hashed name, salt, and iterations in the control layer persistence
using non-relational database. The data control layer communicates with data layer and provides hashed
folder name to persist the user data cloud storage. We have also presented the POC implementation SCARF
over the Amazon Web Services (AWS).
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Appendix 2: Distribution of spot instances over hardware type
Hardware

#instances

price

Maximum Average
price
price

variation

category

(CV)

c1.medium

15

0.016

20.000

0.058

0.280

C1

High

c1.xlarge

15

0.064

2.640

0.174

0.014

m3.large

15

0.016

1.400

0.163

0.038

m3.medium

15

0.008

1.000

0.081

0.003

m3.xlarge

15

0.032

2.100

0.203

0.033

m3.2xlarge

15

0.064

5.600

0.381

0.123

c3.large

15

0.016

1.050

0.072

0.001

c3.8xlarge

15

0.256

19.120

1.443

2.975

c3.4xlarge

15

0.128

8.400

0.430

0.125

c3.xlarge

15

0.032

3.500

0.120

0.010

c3.2xlarge

15

0.064

4.780

0.226

0.055

cc2.8xlarge

9

0.253

2.000

0.388

0.015

cc2

Low(0.207)

m2.2xlarge

15

0.032

1.120

0.232

0.039

m2

High(0.664)

m2.4xlarge

15

0.064

7.360

0.364

0.576

m2.xlarge

15

0.016

3.450

0.093

0.015

g2.2xlarge

15

0.064

7.670

0.618

1.454

g2

High(1.426)

m1.large

15

0.016

0.500

0.058

0.001

m1

Low(0.21)

type

Minimum
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Price

Hardware

Volatility

(0.515)
m3

High
(0.896)

c3

High
(0.804)

m1.medium

15

0.008

0.210

0.029

0.000

m1.small

15

0.008

0.096

0.017

0.003

m1.xlarge

15

0.032

5.000

0.106

0.003

r3.2xlarge

15

0.064

7.000

0.296

0.039

r3.4xlarge

15

0.128

14.000

0.620

0.275

r3.8xlarge

15

0.256

15.000

0.976

0.398

r3.large

15

0.016

1.950

0.135

0.032

r3.xlarge

15

0.032

3.500

0.185

0.024

hi1.4xlarge

9

0.135

0.726

0.293

0.000

hi1

Low(0.061)

t1.micro

15

0.003

1.000

0.006

0.000

t1

Low(0.272)

cr1.8xlarge

6

0.258

3.500

0.619

0.160

cr1

High(0.609)
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r3

High
(0.999)

